The Balance of Forces and the Empire of Liberty: States\u27 Rights and the Louisiana Purchase by Knowles, Robert
Valparaiso University
ValpoScholar
Law Faculty Publications Law Faculty Presentations and Publications
2003
The Balance of Forces and the Empire of Liberty:
States' Rights and the Louisiana Purchase
Robert Knowles
Valparaiso University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.valpo.edu/law_fac_pubs
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Presentations and Publications at ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a ValpoScholar staff
member at scholar@valpo.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert Knowles, The Balance of Forces and the Empire of Liberty: States' Rights and the Louisiana Purchase, 88 Iowa L. Rev. 343 (2003).
The Balance o.f F o .rces 
and the Empire of Liberty: 
States' Rights and the Louisiana Purchase 
Robert Knowles* 
ABSTRACT: This Article challenges the conventional wisdom about the 
Louisiana Treaty and argues that it was unconstitutional. As many 
students of history know, President Jefferson had serious misgivings about 
its constitutionality, which scholars have dismissed as driven by an overly 
strict construction of the Constitution. The Article concludes that Jefferson~ 
concerns were in fact motivated primarily by respect for federalism principles. 
This Article identifies and discusses the underlying conflict betwee.n two 
radically different visions of federalism. While Jefferson s Republicans 
believed that the incorporation of new states in the West would merely 
expand the Constitutions form of government to more territory, creating an 
"empire of liberty, '' the Federalists argued that it would destroy the delicate 
regional balance of power preserved by the Constitution. The author 
concludes that, given the federalism principles at stake, Jefferson ought to 
have give:n more weight to the ''balance of forces" view and carried out his 
plan for presenting a constitutional amendment. 
This Article also contends that the consequences of,]efferson 's failure are 
more serious than scholars have admitted. States' rights claims based on the 
"empire of libetty" theory implicit in the Louisiana Treaty made the spread 
of slavery inevitable. The failure to require an- amendment triggered a 
decline in the use of the Article Five amendment process and set the stage for 
a further weakening of states' rights. Finally, with potential threats to state 
sovereignty on the horizon, the Article concludes that a narrow view of the 
treaty power, consistent with the Supreme Court's recent revival of 
federalism, would best preserve the constitutional principles weakened by the 
Louisiana Purchase. 
* J.D., Northwestern, 2001. Law clerk to the Honorable M. Margaret McKeown, United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Special thanks to Steven Calabresi, Robert 
Bennett, Curtis Bradley, Hillary Krantz, Lee Howard, and the staff of the Iowa Law Review. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In grade school, many of us learned that President Thomas Jefferson 
purchased the Louisiana Territory from Emperor Napoleon of France for 
approximately eleven million dollars. 1 We also learned that the Louisiana 
· Purchase effectively doubled the size of the country, accelerating westward 
expansion as vast new spaces opened for settlement on the western side of 
the Mississippi River.2 As a political maneuver, the purchase was an elegant 
solution to all of Jefferson's major foreign policy headaches. In one fell 
swoop, the United States gained permanent control of the Mississippi River 
and its tributaries and banished France a European power with whom the 
U.S. had just fought an undeclared war from North America for good.3 
Jefferson was surely happy. 
But what most of us learned later, or never at all, is that Jefferson 
l. Students like me who did not always pay attention in school could still learn about 
such things from watching Saturday morning cartoons during the 1970s courtesy of 
"Schoolhouse Rock." "Elbow Room," about westward expansion, conveyed the basic facts: 
The President was Thomas jefferson, 
He made a deal with Napoleon, 
"How'd you like to sell a mile or two (or three or a hundred or a thousand?)" 
And so in 1803 the Louisiana Territory 
Was sold to us without a fuss 
And gave us lots of elbow room. 
The full lyrics are available at http:/ /www.apocalypse.org/pub/u/gilly I 
Schoolhouse_Rock/HTML/history/elbow.html (last visited on Jan. 1, 2002) (on file with the 
Iowa Law Review). 
2. See DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT, FIRST TERM, 1801-1805, at 260 (1970) .. 
From a legal perspective, Professor Malone's multi-volume biography contains the best in-depth 
description of the circumstances surrounding the Louisiana Purchase and Jefferson's 
conflicting views about it. See also 1 HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
DURING THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF THOMAS jEFFERSON 227-392 (Charles Scribner's Sons 
1917) (1889); 4 IRVING BRANT, jAMES MADISON: SECRETARY OF STATE 1800-1809, at 98-159, 
(1953); FORREST McDONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 71 (1976). For a more 
streamlined account, see MARsHALL SMELSER, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, 1801-1815, at 83-
103 (1968). The details of the negotiations with Napoleon, and the court intrigue involved, are 
recounted in ALEXANDER DECONDE, THIS AFFAIR OF LOUISIANA ( 1976). 
The most thorough examination of the constitutional issues remains EVERETT 
SOMERVILLE BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE (1920). Like 
others, I am in debt to Professor Brown's even-handed depiction of the debates on the 
Louisiana Treaty in Congress and within the Jefferson Administration. Brown appears agnostic 
regarding the ultimate constitutional issues, although it is my opinion that Professor Brown 
thought the treaty constitutional. See infra notes 30~05 and accompanying text; see also Downes 
v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 251-55 (1 901) (Brown, J.) (one of the so-called "Insular Cases'-~). For 
more recent analyses, see PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTlONAL 
DECISIONMAKING 73-75 (3d ed. 1992); DAVID P. CORRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE 
JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829, at 95-114 (2001); DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 85-112 (1994). For discussion of these analyses, see infra Part IV.D.2. 
3. MALONE, supra note 2, at 268. 
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privately brooded over the Louisiana Treaty because he doubted its 
constitutionality. "Our peculiar security is in possession of a written 
Constitution," he wrote at the time to his close friend William Cary Nicholas. 
"Let us not make it a blank paper by construction. I say the same as to the 
opinion of those who consider the grant of the treaty making power as 
boundless. If it is, then we have no Constitution."4 Jefferson's concerns 
about exercises of the treaty power echoed the sentiments that drove Anti-
Federalist opposition to it during the state ratifying conventions. 5 In their 
view, the treaty power, even more than the don1estic federal powers 
enumerated in the Constitution, eluded precise definition and presented a 
special danger for believers in a federal government of limited powers. 6 
Jefferson proposed to ease his troubled mind by calling for a 
constitutional amendment to ratify the Louisiana Treaty, but he never 
followed through with his plans. 7 While historians of the nineteenth century 
criticized him for this failure, twentieth century historians concluded that an 
amendment was either unnecessary or impractical, or both.8 ·1n this Article, I 
take Jefferson's doubts seriously, re-examine the Louisiana Treaty, and 
conclude that it was indeed an unconstitutional exercise of the treaty power. 
In letters to friends and colleagues, Jefferson expressed fears that the 
Louisiana Treaty violated principles of strict construction: no provision in 
the Constitution's text granted the federal government power to acquire 
territory and to incorporate states into the Union. In Jefferson's time, this 
omission was, in itself, sufficient to raise serious concern.9 But the landscape 
of constitutional interpretation has changed so drastically since 1803 that 
today's conventional wisdom is, as Professor Martin Flaherty observed, that 
"no constitutional dispute was more important at the time, nor seemingly 
more beside the point now, than the Louisiana Purchase."10 
4. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803). in 8 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 247-48 (Paul Leicester Forded.~ 1899) [hereinafter JEFFERSON 
WRITINGS].jefferson's concerns are discussed in depth in Part IV.C and IV.D.2. 
5. See infra notes 39-63 and accompanying text. 
6. For a discussion o{ early fears about the treaty power, see infra Part II.B. 
7. For a discussion of Jefferson's proposed constitutional amendments, see infra Part 
IV.D. 
8. See infra Part IV. D. 
' 9. See id. One historian referred to the Jeffersonian view of the Constitution's powers as 
"retnarkably cramped.'~ CURRIE, supra note 2, at 105; see also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 189 n.* (2d ed. 1996) (arguing thatjefferson's strict 
views would leave "little room for treaties';). But see Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and 
American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REv. 390, 416 (1998).Jefferson's early views on the treaty power 
were expressed in his Manual on Parliamentary Procedure, written when he was Vice President. See 
infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text. 
10. MartinS. Flaherty, Post-Originalism, 68 U. CHI.. L. REv. 1089, 1094 (2001) (reviewing 
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THEjEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829 (2001)). No 
one is arguing, it's safe to say, that South Dakota ought to be returned to France. Nor are the 
precise constitutional issues confronting. Jefferson whether territory outside the original 
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This Article explains why the conventional wisdom is wrong. More was 
at stake in arguments about the Louisiana Purchase than resolving 
disagreements between advocates of a very strict construction of the 
Constitution and advocates of a more flexible one. As Jefferson's Federalist 
opponents warned at the time, the treaty threatened the constitutional 
principle that inspired jefferson's belief in strict construction states' rights. 
When jefferson announced the Louisiana Treaty, a note of dissent rang out 
from New England. 11 The Federalists understood that, with vast new territory 
would come new states, and that these new states, in the South and West, 
would in all likelihood be slave states.12 The Reverend Manasseh Cutler 
declared to a friend that the treaty was a "flagrant violation of the principles 
of the Constitution."13 The admission into the Union of new states formed 
from this territory would tilt the balance of political power to the South and 
"lay the foundation for the separation of the States. "14 
The heart of the conflict between the Federalists and the newly 
ascendant Republicans was a disagreement about the nature of the 
Constitution itself. Both camps believed in federalism that the states and 
the national government possessed sovereignty. 15 The Federalist 
bounds of the United States may be acquired and incorporated by treaty to double the size of 
the country likely to recur any time soon. There are no concrete plans (that this author is 
aware of) either to acquire territory or incorporate territory through a treaty. But one never 
knows. See john Ellis, Let's Buy Siberia: Don't Laugh, It's a Great Idea, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 8, 1998, 
at A27 (arguing that Clinton could have avoided impeachment by doing something as popular 
as the Louisiana Purchase buying Siberia). At any rate, changes in the nature of the union 
which threaten state sovereignty crop up as the United States participates in comprehensive 
international agreements. See infra Part VI. Finally, a look at the issues raised by the 
geographical expansion of the nation are worthwhile alone for what they reveal about the 
Constitution and our government. See Sanford Levinson, 'Why the Canon Should be Expanded to 
Include the Insular Cases and the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 241, 251-57 
(2000); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Our Hobbesian Constitution: Governing Without Authority, 95 
Nw. U. L. REV. 581 (2001) (discussing the case of Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164 
(1854), which involved the legality of the American military government in California between 
May 30, 1848, when the United States acquired the territory, and Sept. 9, 1850, when California 
was admitted as a state). 
11. See FORREST MCDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION 60 (2000). 
12. See, e.g., Letter from Rufus King to Timothy Pickering (Nov. 4, 1803), in 4 LIFE AND 
CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING 324-325 (Charles King ed., 1900), reprinted in BROWN, supra 
note 2, at 43 ("As by the Louisiana Treaty, the ceded territory must be formed into States ... 
[and] will not the present inequality, arising from the Representation of Slaves, be increased?") 
[hereinafter KING]. 
13. 2 WILLIAM PARKER CUTLER &JULIA PERKINS CUTLER, JOURNALS AND CORRESPONDENCE 
OF REV. MANASSEH CUTLER 138 (1888). 
14. /d. 
15. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(noting the States "fonn distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, 
within their respective spheres, to the general authority than the general authority is subject to 
them, within its own sphere."); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999): 
[A]s the Constitution's structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations 
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interpretation which I call the balance of forces theory viewed the U.S. 
Constitution as a means of maintaining equilibrium among competing 
powers within society, and particularly among the geographical sections of 
the United States.16 Although the balance of forces view had its roots in the 
English Constitution, during the American Revolution the Patriots made it 
their own, believing that "the very idea of liberty was bound up with the 
preservation of this balance of forces." 17 The introduction of new states in 
the west threatened to upset the equilibrium that the Federalists felt was 
necessary to maintain liberty. 
In contrast, the Republicans, rejecting what they saw as an outmoded 
European balance-of-powers model, instead imagined a much more 
idealized Constitution, the principles of which should be applicable to a 
nation of great size and diversity so long as equality among the discrete 
states was maintained. The admission of new states in the West wou.ld merely 
expand the republican form of government to more territory, creating an 
"Empire of Liberty. "18 
Consideration of the battle between these two competing visions of 
states' rights has been the crucial element missing from analyses of the 
Louisiana Treaty's constitutionality.19 While early doubts expressed by 
scholars were soon drowned in a chorus of approbation at the tremendous 
benefit the treaty brought to the United States, little attention has been paid 
to the adverse consequences for the federalism principles embedded in the 
by this Court make clear, the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of 
the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, 
and which they retain today (either literally or by virtue of their admission into the 
Union upon an equal footing with the other States) except as altered by the plan 
of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments. 
16. See JAMES M. BANNER, JR., To THE HARTFORD CONVENTION 27 (1970). For further 
discussion of the balance of farces view, see infra Parts II.B and IV.B. 
17. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 76 
(Enlarged ed., 1992). 
18. Jefferson first used the expression "Empire of liberty" in a letter to George Rogers 
Clark. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Rogers Clark, Dec. 25, 1780, in 2 JEFFERSON 
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 390; see also PETER S. 0NUF, JEFFERSON'S EMPIRE: THE LANGUAGE OF 
AMERICAN NATIONHOOD 65-70 (2000) [hereinafter ONUF, EMPIRE]; ROBERT W. TUCKER & 
DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, EMPIRE OF LIBERlY: THE STATECRAIT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (1990). 
Professor Onuf highlights the difference between these two views of states' rights but sees the 
balance of farces view as reflecting older, European conceptions of the world, and the empire of 
liberty view as reflecting a newer, American conception. The names are my own. See Peter S. 
Onuf, The Expanding Union, in DEVISING LIBER1Y: PRESERVING AND CREATING FREEDOM IN THE 
NEW AMERICAN REPUBLIC 79 (David Thomas Konig ed. , 1995) [he reinafter Onuf, Expanding 
Union]. For more discussion of Onufs views, see infra text accompanying notes 339-53. 
19. Even the earliest commentators, critical of Jefferson for abandoning his strict 
construction of the Constitution, did not mention states' rights as a concern. See infra notes 
285-91 and accompanying text. While Professor Onuf calls attention to the two competing 
theories of federalism, he does not address the constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase. See 
supra note 18. 
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Constitution and dear to the heart of Jefferson.20 In this Article, I contend 
that Jefferson and the Republicans' empire of liberty undertnined federalism 
itself. Under the structure ofthe Constitution, it is insufficient to guarantee 
each state that it will exist on an equal footing with the others. In order to 
respect the sovereignty of the states as well as the national government, the 
states' approval must be sought through the constitutional amendment 
process in which the states themselves share equal p-ower in re-interpreting 
the Constitution whenever profound changes in the nature of the union 
may diminish the ability of existing states to have their interests represented 
in the national government. 
I make a historical argument for the importance of this view based on 
the consequences of the Louisiana Purchase. Slavery frustrated the 
Republicans' empire of liberty vision by demonstrating the growing strength of 
sectional interests. The recognition of the Federalists, balance of forces 
principles would have been critical for avoiding the Civil War. Instead, the 
effort to contain slavery based on a balance offorces view ran head-on into the 
popular sovereignty claims of Stephen Douglas and others, who merely 
applied Jefferson's abstract empire of liberty federalism principles to the new 
states in the West. As the empire of liberty triumphed, so did slavery. The 
Louisiana Purchase marked the substitution of one kind of federalism for 
another, resulting in a vastly diminished role for states in effectuating 
constitutional change~ 
But more than bringing some much-needed balance to our view of 
Jefferson 1s actions and their results, a fresh look at the Louisiana Purchase 
may shed light on the current debate raging in the academy about 
federalism and the Treaty Clause.21 As globalization an-d international 
agreements regulate more pervasively in areas traditionally governed. by 
domestic law,22 efforts are being made to square the Supreme Court's recent 
20. Twentieth-century historians have been far more forgiving of Jefferson than their 
nineteenth-century counterparts. See infra Part IV.D. 
21. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. 
REv. 98 (2000); Martin S. Flaherty, Are We To Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. "States' Rights" in 
Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1277 (1999); David ·M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Naticm: 
The Histarical foundatilmS of the Naticmalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1075 
(2000); Gerald L. Neuman, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1630, 1645-
47 (1999) [hereinafter Neuman, Liberties]; Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 
CONST. COMMENT. 33, 4~9 (1997) [hereinafter Neuman, RFRA]; Carlos Manuel Vazquez, 
Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1317, 1337-43 (1999); Thomas Healy, 
Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalism and the Treaty Power, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 
1726 (1998); Robert Knowles; Comment, Starbucks and the New Federalism: The Court's Answer to 
Globalim,ticm, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 735 (2001). 
'22. See generally Lawrence J. Auerbach, Federalism In the Global Marketplace, 26 URB. LAw. 
235 (1994);_ Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future in the Global Village, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1441. See 
Bradley, supra note 9t at 396 409; John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constituticm: Treaties, N&n-Self-
Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1955, 1967-75 (1999); Knowles, 
supra note 21,. at 749-54. 
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revival of federalism with its decision in Missouri v. Holland generally 
believed to hold the treaty power immune from states' rights limitations.2;3 
Amid today's proliferation of treaties,24 the Louisiana Purchase provides a 
warning that even the most beneficial exercises of national power can 
disrupt the federal-state balance in unintended ways. 
Part II supplies some necessary background. I introduce the two distinct 
views of federalism that formed the backdrop for the framers' design, the 
balance of forces and the empire of liberty. The Louisiana Purchase is an early, 
23. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In Holland, the Supreme Court upheld the Migratory Bird Treaty, 
Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 29 Stat. 1702. 
Justice Holmes rejected Missouri's argument that the treaty power was limited in the same ways 
by federalism as the commerce power: "It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest 
exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty 
followed by such an act could ... . "Holland, 252 U.S. at 433. The Treaty did not "contravene any 
prohibitory words" in the Constitution, and no "invisible radiation ... of the Tenth 
Amendment" limited the scope of the treaty power. !d. at 433-34. 
The Court has yet to overntle Holland, but it has in recent years strengthened states' 
rights vis-a-vis other national powers. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
(prohibiting suits in federal courts for violence on the basis of gender because Congress cannot 
create such a cause of action pursuant to the Commerce Clause); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 
(1999) (holding that Maine state probation officers could not sue the state in Maine courts for 
alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U .S.C. § 201 et. seq.); City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (limiting Congress's power to enact civil rights legislation 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) 
(invalidating a statute commandeering state executive officials); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 
U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that the Commerce Clause does not give Congress the power to 
override states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 ( 1995) (striking down a portion of the Gun Free Schools Act as exceeding 
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause). 
In light of this jurisprudence, some scholars have argued that Holland should be 
overturned, or that its holding should be limited. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 274 ("If a particular law violates the Tenth 
Amendment ... by placing an undue burden on state governments, then it is questionable why 
the same action would be constitutional if undertaken through a treaty."); DANIEL A. FARBER ET 
AL., CAsES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD 
CENTURY 850 (2d ed. 1998); Bradley, supra note 9, at 456-61; Knowles, supra note 21, at 763. 
However, most scholars believe the treaty power exception is justifiable. See HENKIN, supra note 
9, at 442 n.2; Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning 4'Self-Executing" 
and "Non-SelfExecuting" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 515, 530-31 (1991); Healy; supra note 21, 
at 1731; cf Golove, supra note 21 (concluding from a historical study that few subject matter 
limitations apply to the tr~aty power, although state sovereignty limits probably do apply). 
24. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 6-27, S. Exec. Doc. 
No. 95-2 (1978) (defining political rights); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 3, S. Exec. Doc. No. D. 95-2 (1978), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 
(guaranteeing rights of equal treatment in economic and social spheres); International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, art. 4, 
S. Exec. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978), at 1, 3-4, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 218-20 (entered into force Jan. 4, 
1969) (outlawing hate speech); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES, Introductory Note to Part VII, at 144 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RElATIONS] ("[H]ow a state treats individual human beings, including its 
own citizens, in respect of their human rights, is not the state's own business alone."). 
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but relatively unexplored, chapter in the long struggle between proponents 
of broad and narrow interpretations of the Treaty Clause, waged in the halls 
of Congress and in the academy, that continues today. But the purchase 
prominently brought to the surface this deep conflict within federalism. 
From the beginning, Anti-Federalists, and their Republican successors, had 
expressed concern that the treaty power could be wielded by a rogue 
executive and an aristocratic Senate to interfere with individual rights as well 
as state laws and institutions. The principal fear, however, was that the treaty 
power could upset the balance of forces by bargaining away southern states' 
access to the Mississippi River.25 Th.e Treaty Clause was sold to the state 
ratifying conventions with assurances that it would preserve, not destroy, 
intersectional parity. By the time of the Louisiana Purchase, the two camps 
had reversed roles: While the Anti-Federalist's nightmares imagined the 
treaty power as a tool for short-circuiting the federal structure of the 
Constitution, sweeping aside states' rights in the name of national foreign 
policy prerogative, it was their successors, Jefferson's Republicans, who made 
the boldest use of this tool during the Louisiana Purchase. 
Part III provides an explanation for why this Article focuses so much on 
Jefferson's conflict with himsel[ This unusual approach is justified because 
Jefferson's influence was so strong that, during the Louisiana Purchase, the 
strongest checks and balances were his constitutional principles. 
With this backdrop, in Part IV, I analyze the constitutionality of the 
Louisiana Treaty by exa~ining Federalist objections to it, Jefferson's 
. . ·. 
concerns about it, and the congressional debates over it. I begin by 
explaining why th,e Louisiana Treaty <;learly required the incorporation of 
new states from foreign territory.26 I then examine the Federalist opposition 
in New England.27 
As for the constitutionality of the treaty itself, while the acquisition of 
territory inheres in the foreign policy powers of a sovereign state, and is thus 
a permissible use of the treaty power, the authority to incorporate the 
territory into the Union is essentially a domestic power that has the potential 
to profoundly alter the relationship between the states and the federal 
government. The Louisiana Treaty infringed on fundamentally domestic 
matters that qught to lie beyond the scope of the treaty power. The 
Federalists' constitutional objections., however motivated by politics or 
• 
25. The conventional wisdom is that a treaty could not give away state territory. De 
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) (Field,].) (dictum) ("It would no~ be contended that 
[the treaty power] extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids~ or a change in 
the character of the government or in that of one of the states, or a cession of any portion of 
the territory of the. latter, without its consent."}; see also HENKIN, supra note 9, at 193-94; 
Bradley, supra note 9, at 426 n.209. But see Vasan Kesavan, The Treaty-Making Power and American 
Federalism: An Originalist Proof for Missouri v. Holland (tentative title) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with author) .. 
• 
26. See infra Part IV.A. 
27. See infra Part IV.B. 
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jealousy, were correct, and Jefferson should have followed through with his 
plan to seek a constitutional amendment. 
In Part V, I examine the consequences of the failure to ratify the treaty 
with a constitutional amendment. First, the government's ability to control 
the spread of slavery into the new territory proved inadequate in the face of 
states' rights claims based on the empire of liberty theory implicit in the 
Louisiana Treaty.28 Second, the failure to seek an amendment for such an 
important constitutional change led to a decline in the use of the Article 
Five amendment process; which gives the states an equal voice with the 
federal government in constitutional changes.29 Instead, the Louisiana 
Purchase set the stage for subsequent transformations outside of Article Five, 
transformations in which the national government reconstructed the 
constitutional regime in its own favor. Finally, in the Conclusion, I briefly 
address why the lessons of the Louisiana Purchase should cast doubt on the 
now-dominant "nationalist" view of the treaty power. 
II. Two THEORIES OF FEDERALISM AND THE TREA1Y CLAUSE 
Article II of the Constitution provides that the President "shall have 
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, 
provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur."30 A device neither for 
lawmaking nor merely diplomacy, the power to bind the nation in contract 
with foreign states has both executive and legislative aspects.31 It is a strange 
beast. In an age of globalization, where treaties and other kinds of 
international agreements continue to grow in their importance and impact, 
scholars struggling to define the scope of the treaty power confront a 
dilemma. On the one hand, treaties regulate the nation's dealings with 
other countries, and therefore, as in other foreign affairs matters, the 
federal government needs wide latitude.32 On the other hand, if treaties can 
28. See infra Part V .A. 
29. See infra Part V.B. 
30. U.S~ CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
31. SeeTHE FEDERALIST No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 15, at 451 ("The power 
in question seems therefore to form a distinct department, and to belong, properly, neither to 
the legislative nor to the executive."); 3 jOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES§ 1282 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) ("The treaty-making power, 
therefore, seems to fonn a distinct department, and to belong, properly, neither to the 
legislature, nor the executive, though it may be said to partake of qualities common to each."); 
Id. § 1513; Bruce Ackennan & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV~ L. REv. 799, 
808 (1995) ("The Founders established a very complex law-making machine: one system for 
constitutional amendment, another for treaty-making, a third for statute-making."). 
32. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1936) 
("The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers except those 
specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and 
proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of our 
internal affairs.''). However, Curtiss-Wright has been subject to withering criticism. See Michael]. 
Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtis-Wright?, 13 
STATES' RIGHTS AND THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE 353 
regulate anything, the federal government may, in effect, legislate 
domestically by treaty without being bound by the limits of its Article I 
33 powers. 
This dilemma is not new. In fact, the same debate about the scope of 
the treaty power has been waged, with varying intensity, from the time the 
Constitution was ratified. The system of government contemplated by the 
Constitution was unprecedented.34 For the first time in history, a national 
government shared sovereignty with the states.35 But then, as now, this 
federal system ceases to function if the national government can use the 
treaty power as a trump card. In the first subpart, I introduce two theories 
about how the Constitution protects the States from the national 
government which I refer to as the balance of forces and the empire of liberty. 
As I discuss in the second subpart, the Framers had to account for both views 
while drafting the Treaty Clause and seeking to ensure that the Constitution 
would be ratified. 
A. THE BALANCE OF FORCES AND THE EMPIRE OF LIBERTY 
Because fears of a tyrannical national government reflected concerns 
about states wielding authority over one another, the Framers designed the 
national government to minimize the danger that it could become a proxy 
for the interests of any state or group of states.36 The structure of the 
YALE J. INTL. L. 5 ( 1988); David M. Levi tan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. justice 
Sutherland's Theary, 55 YALE LJ. 467 (1946); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtis-Wright 
Export Corporation: An Histurical Reassessment, 83 YALE LJ. 1 (1973). 
33. See Bradley, supra note 9, at 425-26 (arguing that federalism limitations on Congress's 
powers should be applied with equal force to the treaty power); Knowles, supra note 21, at 754 
(reaching the same conclusion in light of the Supreme Court's revival of federalism and 
globalization's in1pact on areas of law traditionally governed by the states). 
34. James Madison told the Virginia Ratifying Convention that the Constitution's federal 
structure "is in a manner unprecedented: We cannot find one express example in the 
experience of the world: It stands by itself." JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS 
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 162 (1996); see also MCDONALD, supra note 11, 
at 9 (observing that the new Constitution's federal system was "undreamed of in political 
philosophy''). To European political philosophers, sovereignty was indivisible, and dividing it 
was the self-contradictory concept of imperium in imperio. /d. at 1. Blackstone had declared that 
"sove reignty and legislature are indeed convertible tenns" and "there is and must be" in every 
state "a supreme irresistible, uncontrolled authority, in which ... the rights of sovereignty 
reside." 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *44 (12th ed.). 
35. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999) ("By splitting the atom of sovereignty, the 
founders established two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own 
privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are 
governed by it." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) ("The Constitution ... , leaves to the several States a residuary and 
inviolable sovereignty ... reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment." (quoting 
THE FEDERALIST No. 39 Qames Madison) supra note 15, at 245) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)). 
36. Madison identified balancing the "interfering pretensions" of different "combinations 
of states" as one of the three major categories of "difficulties inherent in the very nature of the 
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Constitution sought to ensure that this would not happen through two 
federalism safeguards: the composition of the branches of the national 
government would protect a range of state interests, but if these "political 
safeguards" failed, the powers of the national government would be 
constrained, at least to the extent that they could encroach on state 
• 37 
sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, this balancing of states' interests was even more 
complicated than it initially appeared. The States, when considered in the 
abstract, were political entities, each with (more or less) defined borders and 
representative governments. From this perspective, the only salient 
difference between Virginia and Rhode Island was population. Thus the 
compositions of the House and Senate reflected the need to satisfy the 
interests of states with, respectively, large and small populations. 38 Beyond 
this difference in representation, the States were guaranteed protections 
designbd to ensure that the playing field among them remained level. Some 
were explicit: Congress cannot favor the port of one state over another and 
must guarantee to each a Republican form of government.39 The implied 
limits on Congress's powers also protect each state from encroachment on 
its sovereignty. With the exception of population size, all states would be 
treated the same. This was empire of liberty federalism. 
But the Framers were reminded, as the Philadelphia Convention wore 
on, that States were more than mere political entities; they were, even in 
1789, demi-Republics with unique institutions and folkways, comprising a 
\\ride range of geographies, climates, and economic interests that resulted in 
deep, often intractable, differences among them. In order to succeed, the 
new Constitution would have to take these differences into account, to 
balance these shifting forces so that none could assume unfettered 
authority. This was balance of forces federalism. Reconciling it with the 
abstract empire of liberty federalism would not be easy. 
As James Madison came to recognize at the Convention, the most 
significant cultural difference between the States was slavery. Madison's 
earlier efforts at the Convention had emphasized building compromises into 
undertaking referred to the convention." THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 267, 270-71 (James 
Madison) (Ben jam in Fletcher Wright ed., 1961 ) . 
37. See supra note 23. In Federalist 39, ~tadison described the complex ways that 
representation in the new government under the Constitution ranges from national, to state-
based, to mixed. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 36 at 280-86. For 
theory that the political safeguards are the sole federalism protections afforded by the 
Constitution, see jesse H. Choper, the Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability 
of judicial Review, 86 YALE LJ. 1552 (1977); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of 
.Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 
COLUM. L. REV. 543 ( 1954). For trenchant criticism of the "political safeguards" theory, see 
Larry D. Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 4 7 V AND. L. REV. 1485 ( 1994). 
38. RAKOVE, supra note 34, at 68. 
39. See U.S. CONST. art. IV.,§ 4; U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 5. 
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the Constitution that balanced states' interests in the· abstract, but he 
becarne aware that it would not be enough. Madison broached the issue of 
sectionalism, contending that the most material difference causing divisions 
among the states resulted 
partly from climate, but principally from the effects of their having 
or not having slaves. These two causes concurred in forming the 
great division of interest in the U. States. It did not lie between the 
large and small States: it lay between the Northern and Southern, 
and if any defensive power were necessary, it ought to be mutually 
given to these two interests. He was so strongly impressed with this 
important truth that he had been casting about in his' mind for 
some expedient that would answer the purpose.40 
Other compromises would be necessary. The most important was the 
addition of the Three-Fifths Clause, which counted slaves as three-fifths of a 
person for the purposes of determining representation in the House.41 As 
the historian Jack Rakove points out, this revelation unmasked the tensions 
in Madison's own theory of federalism. Which vision was correct? Was it, 
when considered in the abstract, an empire of libcrt~a "society embracing a 
'multiplicity of interests'" defined "in terms of the attributes of individuals"? 
Or was it a nation depending for its stability on a balance of forces, "a nation 
divisible into two great and potentially antagonistic factions, either of which 
could readily imagine how shifts in population and influence might threaten 
its prosperity, institutions, and values alike?"42 At the Convention, however, 
neither Madison nor any of the Framers could afford to choose between the 
balance of forces and th-e empire of liberty. The success of their enterprise 
depended on ensuring that every exercise of national power would take 
both theories of federalism into account. 
The Treaty Power was no exception. In fact, the Anti-Federalists' efforts 
to rewrite the Treaty Clause were rebuffed, and the Constitution was 
approved, only with the understanding that the treaty power would preserve, 
not disturb,. both kinds of state interests~43 Although the requirement that 
treaties be approved by two-thirds of those Senators present protected the 
interests of the states in the abstract, empire of liberty sense, opponents of the 
Constitution claimed that; despite this procedural protection, the Treaty 
Clause would permit the national government to upset the balance of forces. 
The concerns raised at the Constitution's origin foreshadow the subsequent 
debate over the Louisiana Purchase. Just as the Anti-Federalists of th,e 
ratification debates feared that the President and the Senate could violate 
state sovereignty by bargaining away by treaty their territory and access to 
40. RAKOVE; supra note 34, at69; 
41. ld. 
42. ld. at 77-78. 
43. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text. 
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important resources, the Federalists feared the Louisiana Treaty would 
diminish state sovereignty by diluting the ability of the original states to 
advocate for their interests in Congress. Thus the two opposing sides voiced, 
at different times, the same concern: that the treaty power would be used by 
the national government to upset a delicate regional balance of power 
between North and South. In the next subpart, I examine more closely. the 
ways these concerns were initially assuaged. 
B. THE TREA1Y POWER, THE BAlANCE OFFORCES, 
AND THEBA7TLEFORRAT[}1CATION 
( . 
• • 
. From the :very beginning, Anti-Federalists warned that the Treaty Clause 
delivered sweeping power to the national government that could overwhelm 
the rights of individuals and states. These fears were rooted in the American 
Revolution itself, which can be understood "as a defense of the rights of 
popularly elected assemblies to enact internal legislation, free from the 
dictates of a foreign affairs power exercised by a central government'-'44 
Patriot leaders argued that the "Crown granted the colonists the right to 
regulate themselves in all internal matters, just as Parliament" regulated the 
internal matters of Great Britain.45 The colonies operated under a de facto 
system of divided sovereignty, with Parliament governing matters of tr~de 
and commerce and the colonial legislatures governing matters such as 
taxation.46 The Declaration of Independence itself suggests that Jefferson 
and the other Founders understood the relationship between the colonies, 
which it now called "states," and Great Britain to be essentially a "federal" 
47 
one, and thus governed by treaty. 
Naturally, those who distrusted a strong national government focused 
their attention on the treaty power. Moreover, the ways in which they sought 
to limit it reveal the salience of balance of forces federalism. While the records 
of the Convention and the Federalist papers contain little discussion of the 
scope of the treaty power,48 a late effort at the Convention to modify the 
Treaty Clause shows that genuine concern existed among the delegates that 
the treaty power would be abused. Governor Morris introduced an 
amendment that "no Treaty shall be binding on the U.S. which is not 
44. Yoo, supra note 22, at 2004. 
45. Yoo, supra note 22, at 2008; see jOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THEAUTHORI1YTO LEGISlATE 68-74, 11~25 (1991). 
46. McDONALD, supra note 11, at 2. 
47. See ONUF, EMPIRE, supra note 18, at 56. 
48. Bradley, supra note 9, at 410; see also Shackelford Miller, The Treaty Making Power, 41 
AM. L. REv. 527, 529 (1907) ("At no time ... did the convention discuss the scope or extent of 
the power; it merely considered the question as to where the power should be lodged who 
should exercise it. The same is true as to the 'Federalist' .... "). 
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ratified by a law."49 One of the purposes of the amendment, its supporters 
claimed, was to guard against states using the treaty power to strike bargains 
that would harm the interests of the minority of states. Wilson warned that 
"under the clause, without the [Morris] amendment, the Senate alone can 
make a Treaty, requiring all the Rice of S. Carolina to be sent to some one 
particular port"50 While Morris's amendment obviously did not prevail, it 
indicated support for the view expressed earlier by George Mason, that "the 
Senate ... could already sell the whole Country by means of Treaties.''51 
The scope of the treaty power did not emerge as a critical issue, 
however, until the ratification debates~52 Anti-Federalists launched a broad 
attack on the Treaty Clause under the proposed constitution. They warned 
that it gave the national government potentially limitless power. The 
influential Federal Farmer obseiVed that "[t]his power in the president and 
the senate is absolute, and the judges will be bound to allow full force to 
whatever rule, Article, or thing the president and senate shall establish by 
treaty .... "53 In Pennsylvania, Anti-Federalists used the unbounded nature 
of the treaty power to support their proposal for a Bill of Rights. 54 "An Old 
Whig" argued that "the president and two thirds of the senate have power to 
make laws in the form of treaties, independent of the legislature itself, arid 
could enter into a treaty "upon terms which would be inconsistent with the 
liberties of the people and destructive of the very being of a Republic,n and 
yet the Treaty and Supremacy Clauses "will give such a treaty the validity of a 
law. "55 Patrick Henry delivered perhaps the most forceful and persuasive 
arguments against the Treaty Clause during the Virginia Ratifying 
Convention.56 He said, "[t]he Senate, by making treaties may destroy yo·ur 
liberty and laws for want of responsibility."57 The dangers of the treaty power 
were thought to be wide-ranging. 
49. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 392-93 (Max Farrand ed., 
rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter CONVENTION RECORDS]. 
• 
50. ld. at 393. 
51. Id. at 297. 
52. It was discussed by nearly all of the leading delegates, and the debates on the treaty-
making power fill fifty pages of volume 3 of Elliot's Debates, or ten percent of the recorded 
debates of the ratifying convention. :3 DEBATES .N THE SEVERAL STATE C9NVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT 
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 311-13, 316, 325-26, 331-66, 499-516, 609-10 Qonathan Elliot ed., 
1888) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]; Charles Warren, The Mississippi River and the Treaty Clause 
of the Constitution, 2 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 271, 297 (1934). 
53. Letter IV from the Federal Farmer (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 14 THE. DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 43-44 Qohn P. Kaminski & Gasparej. 
Saladino eds.~ 1986) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. 
54. Yoo, supra note 22, at 2044. 
55. An Old Whig III (Phila. lndep .. Gazetteer, Oct. 20, 1787), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 
supra note 53. at 26. 
56. Yoo, supra note 22, at 2067. 
57. 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 53; at 965. 
• 
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In response, amendments were proposed to limit the force and effect of 
treaties vis-a-vis other laws. A Pennsylvania amendment provided that "no 
treaties which shall be directly opposed to the existing laws of the United 
States in Congress assembled shall be valid until such laws shall be repealed 
or made conformable to such treaties," and that treaties would not be valid if 
"contradictory to the Constitution of the United States, or the constitutions 
of the individual states."58 Importantly, according to the New York resolution 
of ratification, New York ratified the Constitution with the understanding 
that "no treaty ought to operate so as to alter the constitution of any state; 
nor ought any commercial treaty to operate so as to abrogate any law of the 
United States.~'59 The ratification debates also focused on the process by 
which treaties might be approved, and what kinds of checks should be 
placed on its exercise by the other branches.60 Among other things, the Anti-
Federalists insisted that there must be a formal role in the treaty-making 
process for the House ofRepresentatives.61 
However, Anti-Federalist concerns about the treaty power were 
grounded in the need to preserve the balance of forces: their deepest fears 
arose from the possibility that the President and the Senate would pursue 
the interests of one section at the expense of another.62 The development of 
the West was thought to benefit the South because many of the settlers were 
from southern families, the southern states would serve as a conduit for 
western goods, and new western states would presumably share the South,s 
58. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 53, at 598. 
59. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 52, at 409 (amendment proposed july 7, 1788). 
60. SeeYoo; supra note 22, at 2047-74. 
61. ld. at 2025. Professor John Yoo argues that the Framers intended that treaties would 
not take effect without implementing legislation approved by the House of Representatives. See 
generally Yoo, supra note 22. 
62. While concerns over the Mississippi River seemed to have aroused more resistance to 
the Constitution, the northern states had a parallel interest in preserving their access to the 
Newfoundland fisheries. See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra, at 343 (remarks of William Grayson): 
It is well known that the Newfoundland fisheries and the Mississippi are balances 
for one another; that the possession of one tends to the preservation of the other. 
This accounts for the eastern policy. They thought that, if the Mississippi was given 
up, the Southern States would give up the right of the fishery, on which their very 
existence depends. It is not extraordinary, therefore, ... that they should wish to 
• 
preserve this great counterbalance. 
/d.; 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 52, at 135 (remarks of Mr. Bloodworth at North Carolina 
ratifying convention) (stating treaties will reflect the 'jarring interests of the Eastern, Southern, 
and the Middle States" which "are different in soil, climate, customs, produce, and every 
thing"); Golove, supra note 21, at 1134 n.l61; Warren, supra note 52, at 297; see also 2 
CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 49, at 548 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris) (referring to 
"Fisheries or the Mississippi" as "the two great objects of the Union"); THE FEDERALIST No. 11 
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 15, at 88 (referring to fisheries, Great Lakes, and Mississippi 
River as "rights of great moment to the trade of America which are rights of the Union"). 
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agricultural interests against the more industrial North.63 Yet, if the U.S. 
failed to gain navigation rights to the Mississippi River, the western lands 
would be closed off to development by the southern states because the 
farmers in the West depended on the river to move their goods.64 William 
Grayson, a former president of the Continental Congress an-d leading Anti-
Federalist lawyer, summarized the thinking of many: "[l]f the Mississippi was 
yielded to Spain, the migration to the Western country would be stopped, 
and the Northern States would not only retain their inhabitants, but 
preserve their superiority and influence over that of the Southern."65 Since 
the new Constitution required only two thirds of the Senators present 
approve a treaty, should any Southern senators not be present, the Northern 
senators and the President could push through a commercial treaty ceding 
to Spain the navigation rights on the Mississippi. During a long critique of 
the Con:stitution in the Virginia House of Delegates that lasted for two days, 
Patrick Henry noted this risk, discussing at great length the mathematical 
possibilities: "While the consent of nine States is necessary to the cession of 
territory you are safe,'1 he said, but "if it be put in the power of a less 
number,'' as with the Constitution, "you will most infallibly lose the 
Mississippi."66 Even the procedural protections provided by the two-thirds 
Senate majority requirement could not keep state interests safe. 
Attacks on the treaty power and concerns surrounding the Mississippi 
question started to turn the tide in Virginia against ratification.67 An 
amendment proposed by delegates in both Virginia and North Carolina 
frankly stated the balance of forces concerns that drove this rebellion: 
no treaty, ceding, contracting, restraining or suspending the 
63. See Lance Banning, Vi1ginia: Sectionalism and the General Good, in RATIFYING THE 
CONSTITUTION 265 (Michael A. Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds., 1989). 
64. Yoo, supra note 22, at 2061-62. 
65. Speech by William Grayson to the Virginia Convention Uune 12, 1788), reprinted in 10 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 53, at 1192; see also 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 52, at 
365 (remarks ofWilliam Grayson): 
I look upon this as a contest for empire. Our country is equally affected with 
Kentucky. The Southern States are deeply interested in this subject. If the 
Mississippi be shut up, emigrations will be stopped entirely. There will be no new 
states formed on the western waters. This will be a government of seven states. This 
contest of the Mississippi involves this great national contest; that is, whether one 
part of the continent shall govern the other. The Northern States have the 
majority, and will endeavor to retain it. This is, therefore, a contest for dominion-
. 
for empire. 
/d.; id. at 501 (remarks of William Grayson) ("The prevention of emigrations to the westward, 
and consequent superiority of the southern power and influence, would be a powerful motive 
to impel [the Northern States] to relinquish that river.''). 
66. 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 53, at 1039 (Statement of Patrick Henry, June 7, 
1788). 
67. Yoo, supra note 22, at 2063. 
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territorial rights or claims of the United States, or any of them, or 
their, or any of their rights or claims to fishing in the American 
seas, or navigating the American rivers, shall be made, but in cases 
of the most urgent and extreme necessity, nor shall any such treaty 
be ratified without the concurrence of three-fourths of the whole 
number of the members of both houses respectively. 68 
These complaints and proposals did not fall on deaf ears. As the battle 
fo.r ratification continued, the Federalists sought to assure the opposition 
that their fears were unfounded, In response to Patrick Henry's claim that 
the "Constitutions of these States may be most flagrantly violated without 
remedy," Edmund Randolph rose and responded that, "neither the life, nor 
property of any citizen, nor the particular right of any State, can be affected 
by a treaty."69 Even when considering a Constitution without a Bill of Rights, 
James Iredell admitted to the North Carolina convention that the "power to 
make treaties can never be supposed to include a right to establish a foreign 
religion among ourselves,- though it might authorize a toleration of 
others."70 Such assurances proved critical, tipping the balance in favor of 
ratification in key states. 
Madison led the effort to change the minds of delegates in his horne 
state of Virginia. He advanced several arguments, including the observation 
that the President, who represented the interests of the entire nation, gave 
treaty-making a republican character. 71 But Madison also assured the 
delegates that " [ t] he exercise of the [treaty] power must be consistent with 
the object of the delegation,; and that "[t]he object of treaties is the 
regulation of intercourse with foreign nations, and is external."72 Madison 
then explained that the new Constitution would better protect the rights of 
the larger states, such as Virginia, which relied on open access to the 
Mississippi, than the existing Articles.73 Recognizing that the House had the 
more republican character, Madiso·n stressed that the House would need to 
pass implementing legislation before any such treaty would take effect.74 
Finally, addressing a point that concerned the delegates a great deal, 
Madison, Edmund Randolph, and Wilson Nicholas assured opponents, at 
68. 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 562 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (hereinafter 
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION]. 
69. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 5.3, at 1384-85 (state.ments of Patrick Henry 
and Edmund Randolph). 
. . 
70. 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 68, at 904-05-. 
71. Yoo; supra note 22, at 2064. 
72. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 53;. at 1396. 
73. Yoo, supra note 22, at 2065. 
74. See Letter from James Madison to George Nicholas (May 17, 1788) ~ in 2 DEBATE ON 
THE CONSTITUTION, .supra note 68, at 443, 448. 
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different points in the Virginia debates, that the law of nations forbade a 
h d d . 75 treaty t at ce e state territory. 
In the end, Madison and his allies prevailed. The great achievement of 
Madison and the other Federalists was in persuading enough delegates at 
the Virginia Ratifying Convention to adopt the proposed Constitution, 
without requiring additional procedural or substantive limits on the treaty 
power, assuring them that balance of forces federalism had already been taken 
into account.76 These pro.mises proved fleeting. Balance of forces federalism 
would be seriously undermined by the Louisiana Treaty. 
III. JEFFERSON'S CONSTITUTION 
This Article places a great deal of weight on the constitutional thought 
of a single person, Thomas Jefferson. This may at first appear problematic. 
Jefferson was not present at the Constitutional Convention; he was not one 
of the Framers, and many historians and legal scholars seem to hold that 
against him. Professor Joseph Ellis summed up this view in a recent jefferson 
biography: when it came to the document he had no hand in writing, 
Jefferson very often "didn't know what he was talking about."77 This may be 
in some sense true, and I will not here tackle that issue, but during the 
Louisiana Purchase, Jefferson became the most important interpreter of the 
Constitution by virtue of his power. Despite the closeness of the 1800 
75. See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 52, at 345 (remarks of James Madison); id. at 357 
(remarks of Wilson Nicholas); id. at 362 (remarks of Edmund Randolph) (noting that "[i]t 
will ... be contrary to the laws of nations to relinquish territorial rights"). As Vasan Kesavan 
argues, however, this does not mean that, under certain circumstances, a treaty could not cede 
state territory. See Kesavan) supra note 25. Still, such a situation was virtually unthinkable: as 
Madison said to the delegates, "the legislative authority to dismember the empire ... ought not 
to be given, but by the necessity that would force the assent from every man." 3_ EU.IOTtS 
DEBATES, supra note 52, at 501. In such circumstances, one assumes that a constitutional 
amendment could be obtained to approve something which could not be done through the 
treaty power. 
76. 3 ElliOT'S DEBATES, supra note 52, at 352. Even their opponents acknowledged that 
this was the goal: Patrick Henry declared that "[t]o preserve the balance of American power 
[between the Northern and Southern States], it is essentially necessary that the right of the 
Mississippi should be secured." 
77. jOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHlNX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS jEFFERSON 330 
(Vintage ed. 1998) (paraphrasing a statem~nt by Dolly Madison); see also MERRILL PETERSON, 
jEFFERSON AND MADISON AND THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 1-2 (1987); Golove~ supra note 
21, at 1188 n.352. Jefferson was serving as Ambassador to France, but he did correspond 
frequently with Madison and Monroe during the Philadelphia Convention (even sending the 
Constitution's primary architect a trunkful of philosophy books) and during the ratification 
debates. See ELLIS, supra, at 114-25. Madison also approvingly quoted Jefferson's ''Notes on the 
State of Virginia" when stressing the importance of the Constitution's separation Qf power in 
avoiding tyranny. See FEDERALIST No. 48 Uames Madison), supra note 15, at 278-79. The special 
relationship between Jefferson and Madison fonned a personal system of ''checks and 
balances," and they influenced one another at key moments. ELLIS, supra, at 144 45.Jefferson's 
views on the Constitution were either vague or complex, depending on your point of view. For 
an in-depth treatment, see generally MAYER, supra note 2. 
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presidential election in terms of the electoral vote; Jefferson entered office 
on a Republican tidal wave that drowned Federalist opposition throughout 
the United States.78 And once in office, Jefferson "was a stronger president 
than either of his. predecessors tried to be."79 According to biographer 
Dumas Malone, Jefferson's influence in Congress remained unmatched 
until the Wilson administration, and Con:gress passed ''virtually no bills of 
any significance" without jefferson's approval.80 
Moreover, despite the Supreme Court's bold move in -Marbury v. 
Madison earlier that year, the Jefferson administration negotiated and 
pushed the Louisiana Treaty through Congress without even mentioning the 
prospect of the Supreme Court placing limits on executive or legislative 
power. Regardless of what others said at the time and afterward, to a 
remarkable degree, Jefferson's conclusions about what the Constitution did 
or did not perffiit largely determined future practice.81 
Federalism. was, for Jefferson, the most important canon· of 
Constitutional interpretation .. 82 "The best general key for the solution of 
.questions of power between o.ur governments," he wrote, is that "'every 
foreign and federal power is given to the federal government, and to the 
States every power purely domestic. "'83 Similarly, he wrote that " [ w] he never 
a doubt arises to which of these branches [state or federal] a power belongs, 
I try it by this test."84 Jefferson understood federalism as the overall purpose 
and design of the Constitution.85 A necessary corollary to Jefferson's 
federalism was the strict interpretation of delegated federal powers, which 
should be .construed "according to the plain an.d ordinary meaning of it's 
[sic] language, to the common intendment of the time, and of those who 
f d . "86 s . . b 11 f . ' rame It. · trict construction was a ove a a means o · protecting states · 
rights. 
; 
78. See LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERS1JASION 278 n.l5 (1978). 
79. /d. at 280. 
80. MALONE, supra note 2, at 110. See also CURRIE, supra note 2, at 9; MALONE, supra note 2, 
.at xv (Jefferson ''exercised influence on legislation which has been rarely matched in 
presidential history"). · 
81. Jefferson was aware of this as much as anyone. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in 8JEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 247-48 ("I think 
it important, in the present case, to set an example against broad construction."). 
82. MAYER, supra note 2, at 188-89. 
83. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Robert J. Garnett (Feb. 14, 1824), in 10 JEFFERSON 
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 295. 
84.. Letter frorn Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Apr. 4, 1824), in 10 JEFFERSON 
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 300. 
85. MAYER, supra note 2, at 189. Jefferson called the Tenth Amendment the ~'foundation 
ofthe Constitution." MCDONALD, supra note 11, at 24; U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution; nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reseiVed to the States respectively, or to the people.''). 
86. Letter from Thomas jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 24, 1825), in 10 JEFFERSON 
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 352. 
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Jefferson did relax principles of strict construction once he was certain 
the matter did not touch on states' rights. Professor David Mayer points out 
that Jefferson could "espouse a fairly liberal theory of interpretation 
embracing even implied powers. This was especially so in the realm of 
foreign affairs, which he regarded as an exclusive responsibility of the 
national government since the time of the Articles of Confederation.''87 
Jefferson felt free to use executive authority when acting overseas.88 
But jefferson did not view treaties as just any exercise of foreign affairs 
powers. Like the early Anti-Federalists, he knew that the scope of the Treaty 
Power was potentially vast, and that treaties could implicate domestic 
matters. This became apparent during the nationwide controversy over the 
Jay Treaty with Great Britain. Negotiated by the high Federalist john Jay, the 
treaty contained many provisions objectionable to the Republicans, 
including a clause permitting British citizens owning lands in the U.S. to 
devise or sell them without forfeiture.89 Throughout the country, Jay was 
burned in effigy and a flood of articles condemning the treaty were 
bl. h d. 90 pu ts . e 10 newspapers. 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, both of whom violently opposed 
the treaty, engineered the fight against it in Congress.91 Jefferson viewed the 
Jay Treaty as a partisan attempt by the pro-British faction to entrench 
themselves in power in defiance of public opinion and popular 
sovereignty.92 While other Republicans charged that the treaty was 
unconstitutional because it violated the rights of states by interfering with 
their property laws, Madison, for the most part, stuck to the position he had 
taken during the rati6cation debates all those provisions normally 
requiring the assent of both houses of Congress would require the approval 
of the House to take effect.93 The Federalists insisted that the treaty was self-
executing.94 In any event, the issue became academic once the House voted 
• 
87. MAYER, supra note 2, at 215. 
88. ELLIS, supra note 77, at 240-41. Ironically, Jefferson used the navy he had opposed as 
Secretary of State to pursue the Barbary Pirates when he became President. /d. at 241. Jefferson 
aggressively pursued commercial treaties with other nations, and sought to limit state 
. . 
interference with them, under the Articles of Confederation, and later on in his presidency. 
Golove, supra note 21, at 1130. 
89. The Jay Treaty, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr~ Brit., in 2 TREATIES, AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 245, 253-54 ( 1931). 
90. SeeGolove, supra note 21, at 1164. 
91. /d. at 1178. 
92. ld. at 1155. 
93. See, e.g., James Madison, Jay's Treaty, Speech in the House of Representatives (Mar. 7,: 
1796), in 16 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 141, 254 (J.C.A. Stagg et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter 
MADISON PAPERS]; Golove, supra note 21, at 1183. 
94. Golove, supra note 21, at 1126. 
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51 to 48 to carry the treaty into effect amid fears that failure would lead to 
the collapse of the government.95 
Jefferson expressed himself :more forcefully than Madison when it came 
to the treaty power.96 He demonstrated legendary contempt for it, writing to 
Madison: "I see no harm in rendering (the House's] sanction necessary, and 
not much harm in annihilatin,g the whole treaty making power. "97 Later, 
when he b.ecame Vice President, and thus President of the Senate, Jefferson 
published his views on the treaty power in the Senate's Manual of 
Parliamentary Practice.98 First, he pointed out that a treaty "must concern 
the foreign nation, party to the contract, or it would be a mere nullity."99 
Second, he wrote that treaties can only be used on '"objects which are usually 
regulated by treaty," and, even then, only when those objects "cannot be 
otherwise regulated." 100 Third, treaties cannot cover "those subjects of 
legislation in which [the Constitution] gave a participation to the House of 
Representatives. "101 He added, "This last exception is ,denied by some, on the 
ground that it would leave very little matter for the treaty power to work on. 
The less the better, say others."102 Finally, turning to states' rights, Jefferson 
concluded that the Constitution "must have meant to except out of these the 
rights resetVed to the States; for surely the President and the Senate cannot 
do by treaty what the whole government is interdicted from doing in any 
. ,,103 
way. 
• 
95. /d. at 1156; jERALD A. COMBS, THE jAY TREA1Y: POLITICAL BAITLEGROUND OF THE 
FOUND INC FATHERS 179-87 (1970). 
96. Professor Go love concludes that jefferson's views during the early 1790s changed from 
a broader to a narrower interpretation. See Golove, supra note 21, at 1178-79. One possible 
explanation, other than simple political considerations~ was that jefferson began to see the ways 
that treaties could infringe on domestic, and state, prerogatives. The Jay Treaty, if it did not 
confirm his existing views completely, in all likelihood pushed him further toward the view that 
the treaty power should be as limited as practicable. 
97. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 27, 1796), in 16 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 93, at 280. 
98. Thomas Jefferson, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice § 52, in 1 The WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 335, 441 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907). 
99. ld. at 442. 
100. Id. 
101. ld. 
102. /d. 
103. Jefferson, supra, note 98, at 335. While Jefferson's summary in the Handbook certainly 
reflects a stricter view of the treaty power than that of his Federalist opponents, it is not at all 
clear that his views were out of the mainstream. See Bradley, supra note 9, at 416 ("Both the 
subject matter and federalism- limitations he suggested [in his Manual of Parliamentary 
Practice] appear to have been consistent with the prevailing views of the time.t'). Jefferson 
insisted that he did not differ from Madison or other Republicans. MAYER, supra note 2, at 233-
34. Professor David Colove believes that Jefferson's views were idiosyncratic and were largely an 
attempt to rankle the Federalists in the wake of the Jay Treaty controversy. See Golove, supra 
note 21, at 1188. But nothing that transpired during the Jay Treaty controversy actually proved 
Jefferson's views to be in error. The House did finally agree to implement even the 
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Jefferson believed that it was dangerous for the national .government to 
exercise the foreign policy powers in a way that might give it a domestic 
advantage over the States. This was particularly true with regard to 
expanding the size of the United States. In fact, this. is the topic that first 
inspired him to articulate the empire of liberty theory of federalism. How could 
the rights of the states be protected? Any new territory should enter the 
Union as a state, or not at all. He feared that large expanses of federally 
controlled territory would lead to the aggrandizement of the national 
government at the expense of the states. A group of colonies or client states 
in the West could be wielded against :the original members of the Union. 104 
Jefferson wrote that, "[c]ontrary to the principle of Montesquieu, it will be 
seen that the larger the extent of country, the more firm its republican 
structure, if founded, not on conquest, but in principles of compact and 
equality."' 105 Those two principles were key. The formal ability of "states to 
engage in the compact was the essential condition for creating a true 
union."106 But he meant the ability of new states to join the compact on an 
even footing with the old. Jefferson's empire of liberty theory was born. 
Finally, Jefferson believed that states' righ-ts could be protected by the 
frequent use of Article V, which ensured that States retained an important 
role in the prpcess of changing the Constitution. This went hand-in-hand 
with the principles of strict construction. Jefferson strongly believed that the 
people should participate as much as possible in resolving constitutional 
q·uestions. 107 The English Whig political philosophers, whom Jefferson 
studied and admired, criticized the English constitution because it lacked a 
method for ensuring that the sovereign voice of the people would be 
he~rd. 108 James Burgh wrote in his Political Disquisitions that "the ,people 
ought to provide against their own annihilation. They ought to establish a 
regular and constitutional method of acting by and from themselves, 
without, or even in opposition, to their representatives, if nec.essary. "109 For 
Jefferson, Article Five the constitutional convention provision in 
particular presented a good answer, and this persuaded him to support the 
Constitution. Article Five was, he wrote, a means by which "the people might 
recurr [sic] to first principles in a Regular Way, without hazarding a 
controversial provisions, and so there was no opportunity to test Jefferson's claims in the 
Handbook. And, if we accept the Handbook as a true guide to Jefferson's views on the treaty · 
power, it explains why the Louisiana Purchase seemed to trouble him so much. 
104. 0NUF, EMPIRE, supra note 18, at 39. 
105. /d. at 118. 
106. ld. 
107. MAYER, supra note 2, at 314. 
108. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 323 
(1969). 
109.. ld. (quotingjames Burgh). 
• 
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Revolution in the Government."110 Article Five thus brought Whig theory to 
the world of practical political reality, and for Jefferson, this important safety 
valve ensured that the Constitution remained relevant to the concerns of the 
d Ill ay. 
A quick survey of Jefferson's constitutional interpretation would not be 
complete without a caveat. The man who believed that the Constitution 
should be narrowly interpreted also developed an exception that made strict 
construction possible. Jefferson, in a letter to a friend in 1810, articulated a 
constitutional necessity defense for higher officials ''when the safety of the 
nation, or some of its very high interests, are at stake."112 He then outlined 
some of the situations in which this doctrine of executive prerogative had 
been applicable. 113 This way, when criticizing overreaching by the national 
government, Jefferson could continue to advocate forcefully the principles 
of federalism and strict construction while justifying his own and others' 
departure from them when it suited the interests of the nation.114 The 
burning question, as far as the Louisiana Purchase is concerned, is whether 
Jefferson's exception effectively swallowed the rule. 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALI1Y OF THE LOUISIANA TREA1Y 
Under the Louisiana Treaty, the United States engaged in two 
unprecedented activities it acquired territory from another nation and 
incorporated that territory as states. Neither of these powers are explicit in 
the text of the Constitution. As to the first activity, it now seems obvious that 
while the acquisition of territory raised concerns among Federalists and 
troubled,Jefferson, it was so inextricably intertwined with the foreign policy 
powers of the nation that even strict constructionists of the time could 
reasonably believe that the treaty power encompassed it. 
However, America's system of government was also unprecedented .• 15 
This is why the incorporation of states into the Union by treaty raised 
troubling questions never before addressed. 116 The U.S. Constitution 
110. MAYER, supra note 2, at 299. 
111. Id. 
112. Letter from Thomas Jefferson toJ.B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 12 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS jEFFERSON 421-22 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellergy Bergh eds., 1904) 
(hereinafter jEFFERSON WRITINGS (LIPSCOMB)). 
113. See id. 
114. See ELLIS, supra note 77, at 192 (contrasting the views of jefferson and Madison). Ellis 
concluded thatjefferson's remarks -concerning theJay Treaty demonstrated "greater willingness 
to bend constitutional arguments to serve what he saw as a higher purpose .... Upsetting 
delicate constitutional balances or setting dangerous precedents did not trouble him in such 
moments." /d. 
115. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
116. Given the unprecedented nature of the federal system established by the Constitution, 
it is dearly not sufficient to argue that the national government has the power to incorporate 
new· teiTitory as states merely because the European monarchs had the power to acquire 
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established a federal system in which the national government shared· 
sovereignty with the states!17 H,ow would the existing states' sovereignty be 
affected if the national government introduced new states into the Union? 
The Federalists and the Republicans offered different answers to this 
question, and the answers shaped their reactions to the Louisiana Treaty~· 
Under the Republicans' abstract empire of liberty view of federalism, the 
admission of new states merely meant expanding the federal system to new 
geographical areas. In contrast, the Federalists' balance of forces view held that 
the introduction of new states could. upset the balance among competing 
interests, which the Constitution had been designed to preseiVe, and upon 
• 
which individual freedom and prosperity depended. As I argue in the 
second Part, and in the rest of the Article, the successful expansion of the 
United. States depended on the ability and willingness of those in power to 
take both views into account. 
This Part proceeds in four subparts. The first provides the backdrop: 
what did the .Louisiana Treaty actually do? The policy of the United States 
government since before the Constitution had been· to enshrine statehood 
as the inevitable status of all territory. Because Jefferson and his 
administration believed firmly in this policy and wished to avoid permanent 
colonial fiefdoms, I conclude that the Louisiana Treaty required that the 
acquired territory would eventually be incorporated as new states. The 
. . 
second part describes the public opposition to the Louisiana Treaty in. New· 
England, where Federalists declared the Purchase unconstitutional on 
balance of forces federalism gro·unds. The third part examines a threshold 
issue: whether the national government, under the Treaty or the New States . 
Clauses, actually had the power to acquire the territory in the first place. 
Finally, the fourth part discusses the thornier question: at what point does 
the incorporation of new states threaten the rights of the existing states? 
A. THE LO·UISIANA TREATY AND THE ADMISSION OF NEW STATES 
• • 
The Louisiana Purchase was the surprise ending to a foreign policy 
crisis that began when Jefferson tried to address the perennial concern of 
territory. Nonetheless, this argument was advanced by Republicans during the debate over the 
treaty., See, e.g., 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 448-49 {Oct. 1803) (statement of Rep. Elliott) (arguing 
. . . 
that the Treaty Clause should be read as providing the same powers possessed under the-law of 
nations, citing Vattel, Grotius, and Puffendorf, as well as others to establish the right to acquire 
. 
territory by treaty). · 
117. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999) ("By splitting the atom of sovereignty, the 
founders established two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own 
privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who su~tain it and are 
governed by it." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) ("The Constitution ... leaves to the several States a residuary and 
inviolable sovereignty ... reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment." (quoting 
THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 15, at 245) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)). 
• 
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• 
the southern and western states preserving free navigation on the 
Mississippi River. 118 Events moved so swiftly, and the opportunity was 
presented to Jefferson so suddenly, that he had relatively little time to 
consider the appropriate steps under the Constitution to carry out such a 
significant change in the composition of the United States. 
In 1795, the United States signed the Treaty of San Lorenzo with Spain, 
which owned Louisiana and the Floridas, securing free navigation on the 
Mississippi. 119 American merchants could sail the length and breadth of the 
river and deposit their goods in New Orleans pending export without paying 
custom duties; in a few years they came to believe these were their rights. 120 
But in 1800, Spain secretly agreed to cede the province of Louisiana back to 
France. While Spanish officials had granted Americans even more access 
than the treaty called for, France was considered to be a much harsher 
neighbor, the most "rapacious" and "aggressive" of the great powers. 121 News 
. 
of the secret agreement slowly leaked out during 1800. Making matters 
worse, in a move considered by other Spanish officials in the New World to 
be a violation of the Treaty of San Lorenzo, the Spanish Intendent in New 
Orleans closed the deposit in 1802, leaving Americans without a place to 
store their goods. This precipitated a political crisis in America, which called 
for an immediate response from the Jefferson administration. 122 Rufus King 
believed that France had obtained Louisiana in an effort to weaken the 
Union because it was "the opinion of influential persons in France that there 
was a natural line of separation between the American people on the two 
sides of the mountains." 123 
Jefferson, for whom an important and growing base of his political 
support lay in the West, moved quickly to resolve the crisis. He appointed 
Robert Livingston and James Monroe to negotiate with France to secure the 
rights of Americans to navigate the Mississippi. 124 The instructions called for 
making the river the boundary between the United States and Louisiana and 
for acquiring New Orleans and the Floridas for the United States.125 The 
House voted to appropriate two million dollars for the task. 126 Senator Ross 
of Pennsylvania introduced a resolution urging the President to seize the 
same territory by force! 27 Only four months later, ljvingston and Monroe 
118. For a discussion of these concerns, see supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text. 
119. MALONE, supra note 2, at 239. 
120. /d. 
121. /d. at 240. 
122. /d. 
123. !d. at 249. 
124. BROWN, supra note 2, at 9. 
125. Id. The details of the negotiations with Napoleon, and the court intrigue involved, are 
recounted in DECONDE, supra note 2. 
126. McDONALD, supra note 2, at 66. 
127. /d. at 95-96. 
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wrote from Paris, announcing that France had offered to sell the U.S. the 
. . f L . . 12s enure proVInce o . ouisiana. 
Jefferson responded speedily to this happy surprise. He and Madison 
wrote back to approve the deal, w·hich called for a payment to France of 
$11,250,000 in six per cent stock and the assumption of claims of American 
citizens against France totaling $3,750,000. 129 Although the precise 
boundaries of the territory were unknown, Jefferson knew that the treaty 
would give the United States control over the Mississippi and its 
. b . 130 trt u tar1es. 
. But the portion of the treaty that 'vould arouse the most interest, and 
the most controversy, was Article III, which seemed to require that the 
territory of Louisiana be admitted into the Union as a state or states: 
The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the 
Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, 
according to the principles of the Federal constitution, to the 
enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens 
of the United States; and in the mean time they shall be 
maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, 
property, and the religion which they profess.131 
Despite the seeming clarity of the words "incorporated" and "admitted,'' 
evidently some confusion existed about the legal effect of the provision. One 
contemporary writer suggested that there were three possibilities regarding 
the Louisiana territory's status: it could enter the Union immediately as a 
state or states; it could be ,considered a territory like the Indiana and 
Mississippi Territories, which were part of the original United States, but not 
yet states themselves; or, it could be a colo,nial "fiefdom" of the U.S., similar 
to Canada and Jamaica in relation to En,gland!32 
However, an examination of the longstanding federal government 
policy with regard to the open lands in the West, and Jefferson's own views 
on the status of territory, strongly indicate that Article III meant precisely 
what it said. Since the very beginning of the Republic, it was widely assumed 
. . 
that territories could look forward with certainty to statehood and admission 
to the union.133 There was very little doubt that this would hold true for the 
128. BROWN, supra note 2~ at 13. 
129. MALONE, supra note 2, at 302. 
130. /d. at303. 
131. Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana, Apr. 30; 1803, art. Ill, U.S.-Fr., 8 Stat. 200, 202. 
132. AlLAN B. MAGRUDER, ESQUIRE POLITICAL, COMMERCIAL AND MORAL REFLECfiONS, ON 
THE LATE CESSION OF LOUISIANA, TO THE UNITED STATES 95 (1803). 
133. PETERS. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION 108 (1987). This is no longer true. In the 
Insular Cases, the Supreme Court distinguished between "incorporated" and "unincorporated" 
territories. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 279 (1901) (plurality opinion) (holding 
that Puerto Rico is "unincorporated" and thus Article I, § 8, cl. 1, requiring "uniform duties 
throughout the United States," does not apply to it, meaning Congress has the power to 
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Louisiana Territory as it had for the already-existing. territories. 
When Congress be:gan serious planning for the future of the West in 
early 1784, Jefferson headed the committee and drafted a charter for 
temporary government of the western territories.134 This plan, the ''1784 
ordinance," set the boundaries for sixteen new states in the area north of the 
Ohio River and in the western regions of original states that would cede 
f h · · 135 Th d. . d h d . . some o t etr territory. -e or tnance promtse t e new states a .. mission 
to the union when their respective populations became equal to that of the 
smallest existing state.136 What is striking about the ordinance is that it links 
statehood and settlement so closely together; Jefferson essentially felt that 
statehood was simultaneous with the process of settlement.137 Jefferson 
wanted to avoid at all costs the establishment of a colonial regime in the· 
West, which he believed would be a source of power for the national 
government. Thus the existence of states was taken for granted. 138 
' Congress grew concerned with the disappointing results, however, and 
a committee, headed by James Monroe, was appointed to revise the 
ordinance. One concern was that the high degree of autonomy granted 
settlers under the 1784 ordinance was stifling growth through lack of law, 
order, or the clarity of land titles. 139 In addition, the ordinance's plan for a 
large number of small states alarmed Easterners who, already fearing that 
their influence in Congress would decline in favor of the Republicans and 
western interests, planned to raise the population requirement for statehood 
regulate territorial tariffs in a way it could not if Puerto Rico were a state). Under this dual 
regime, incorporated territories could look forward to :eventual statehood, while-
unincorporated territories could not. See Levinson, supra note 10, at 246. The conclusions 
reached in the Insular Cases have shaky foundations. See id.: 
But no one can plausibly believe that Downes was decided as a detached, 
dispassionate exegesis :of prior opinions. The doctrine of "unincorporated 
territories" ... was the product ... of the perceived exigencies of the moment, 
which made Puerto Rico and the Philippines at once highly desirable as 
possessions of the United States yet, it was thought, unsuitable for genuine 
membership in the American Union. 
For further criticism of the Insular Cases and the limbo status of territories. such as Puerto Rico, 
the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam, see JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO 
RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (1985). There is very little evidence that the 
concept of unincorporated territories had much support at the time the Louisiana Treaty was 
negotiated. Certainly, Jefferson would have hated the idea. See infra notes 134-38 and 
accompanying text. 
134. ONUF, supra note 133, at 46. 
135. ld. at 46-47. 
136. /d. at 46. 
137. 1d. at 54. 
138. /d. at51. 
139. ONUF, supra note 133, at 50. 
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to an impossibly high number.140 Without enough population, then, these 
inchoate states might remain at territorial status indefinitely. 
The result of Monroe's efforts, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 
established territorial governments but nonetheless retained the promise of 
statehood from the original 1784 ordinance .. It also set forth the boundaries 
of potential states. The final section of the Ordinance announced, "The 
following articles shall be considered as articles of compact between the 
original States, and the people and States in the said territory, and forever 
remain unalterable, unless by common consent .... " The Fifth Article 
provided that "[t]here shall be formed in the said territory, not less than 
three, nor more than five States .... "141 Monroe assured Jefferson, who was 
then serving in Paris as Ambassador to France, that establishing temporary 
territorial governments would actually facilitate Jefferson's principles 
because it would speed up population growth and ensure the quick 
attainment of statehood. 142 Edward Carrington wrote to Jefferson that the 
main purposes of the Northwest Ordinance were to establish "a Temporary 
Government" in the West and provide "for its more easy passage into 
S G ,143 permanent tate overnments. 
Although the Northwest Ordinance separated the concept of statehood 
from settlement, it nonetheless enshrined statehood as the preferred, 
indeed inevitable, status of any territory held by the federal government. 
Moreover, unlike Jefferson's 1784 ordinance, which required the assent of 
nine of the existing states for admission, the Northwest Ordinance would 
simply conjure new states into existence when the population reached the 
sixty thousand threshold. 144 The Ordinance also seemed to bind the national 
government in a way that earlier plans had not. The Compact section of the 
Ordinance, in particular, indicated that its writers intended for it to have 
"constitutional" effect in the sense recognized at the time of the 
Revolution that it was a compact between the United States and the 
sovereign settlers in the territories. 145 A territorial delegate, Paul Fearing, 
told Congress in 1802 that the Ordinance "compact is the Supreme Law of 
140. Letter from James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson (July 16, 1786), in 8 LETTERS OF THE 
MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 390-94 (Edmund C. Burnett ed., 1921-36) 
[hereinafter CONGRESS LETTERS]. 
141. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 52-53 (amended 1789); Letter from James 
Monroe to Thomas jefferson (July 16, 1786), in 8 CONGRESS LETTERS, supra note 140, at 390-94; 
0NUF, STATEHOOD, supra note 133, at 52. 
142. Letter from James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson (May 11, 1786), in 8 CONGRESS 
LETTERS, supra note 140, at 359-60. 
143. Letter from Edward Carrington to Thomas jefferson (Oct. 23, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS jEFFERSON 252-57 (Boyd et. al. eds., 1950-) [hereinafter JEFFERSON PAPERS]. 
144. ONUF, supra note 133, at 59. 
145. /d. at xviii. For the concept that the revolutionaries considered constitutions to be 
"compacts" or "treaties," see WOOD, supra note 108, at 259-305; DonaldS. Lutz, From Covenant to 
Constitution in American Political Thought, PUBLIUS, Fal11980, at 101-30. 
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the land, and is in the nature of a treaty." 146 As late as the 1820s, 
commentators such as William Rawle assumed that the Ordinance bound 
the United States to recognize a territory's right to gain admission to the 
U . h . h . I d d" . 147 n1on w en It met t e st1pu ate . con 1t1ons. 
The understanding of the Northwest Ordinance as a constitutionally 
binding document collapsed by 1850 when the U~S. Supreme Court 
declared that it had been "superceded" by the Constitution, and that it had 
no legal force. 148 Nonetheless, it articulated settled government policy 
toward the territories at the time Monroe and Livingston negotiated the 
Louisiana treaty's terms in Paris. If anything, the new Republican 
administration favored the admission of new states at a faster rate than 
. d' b' h 0 d. 149 requtre . y t e r tnance. 
This policy was reflected in the instructions Monroe and Livingston 
received from the Jefferson administration. Madison wrote in the proposed 
treaty that "to incorporate the inhabitants of the hereby ceded territory with 
the citizens of the U ni:ted States on an equal footing ... it is to be expected, 
from the character and policy of the United States, that such incorporation 
will take place without unnecessary delay."150 In explaining this provision, 
Madison wrote in the instructions that the only reason for not immediately 
incorporating the inhabitants of any ceded territory was that they may be 
entitled to "consent to the act of cession," which he fully expected them to 
do.I5t 
With the policies of the Northwest Ordinance as a backdrop, it is clear 
that Article III of the Louisiana Treaty bound the United States to 
incorporate Louisiana into the union. The Louisiana Treaty was, like the 
Northwest Ordinance, a compc:tct with the residents of the territory that 
promised they would become full citizens of the United States. Even though 
the treaty did not set any timetable, nor did it, like the Ordinance, promise 
statehood upon the achievement of any particular population, there is no 
reason to believe Article III was not taken as seriously as the provisions of the 
treaty in which the United States pledged to pay France for the cession. 
Indeed, the three major agreements that made up the treaty, as historian 
Alexander DeConde obsetved, ''formed one transaction and were 
146. 11 ANNALSOFCONG. 1103 (speech of March 30, 1802). 
147. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (De 
Capo Press 1970) (1829); seealso3 STORY, supra note 31, at 160. 
148. Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82t 95--96 (1850). 
149. See ONUF, s?.lpra note 133, at 59-61. Ohio had been admitted to statehood while the 
Louisiana Treaty was being negotiated, and "the broad consensus" was that "the Ordinance and 
not the Constitution governed Congress' authority with respect" to its admission. CURRIE, supra 
note 2, at 94. 
150. 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 1101 (1802-03). 
151. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe, in BROWN, supra note 2·, at 66. 
\. 
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interdependent.''152 Since territory was then considered merely to be a 
transitional phase in preparation for the imminent achievement of 
statehood, the Louisiana Purchase meant the admission of an unknown 
number of new states into the Union. 
B. THE BALANCE OF FORCES: }EDERALIST OPPOSITION IN NEW ENGLAND 
.. Despite the widespread popularity of the Louisiana Purchase, the treaty 
raised alarm bells in New England, the last bastion of Federalist influence. 
Struggling to articulate why the treaty violated the Constitution, the 
Federalists ironically summoned the same balance of forces federalism 
principle that inspired their opponents, th~ Anti-Federalists, during the 
ratification debates. The consequences of the treaty were more than just 
political, New Englanders concluded. The Constitution did not permit such 
a sweeping transformative act because it ignored the understandings upon 
which the Constitution itself had been ratified. 
In his History of the United States, Henry Adams wrote that, when the news 
of the Louisiana Treaty was announced on July 4, 1803, "the Federalist 
orators ... set about their annual task of foreboding the ruin of society amid 
the cheers and congratulations of the happiest society the world then 
knew. "153 But the reality is that, in general terms, the cession of the 
Louisiana territory to the United States initially met with approval even in 
the strongholds of Federalism. The Newburyport Herald announced that 
''[t]his province will prove a valuable acquisition to our growing empire .... 
We pleasurably yield a tribute of praise for one meritorious transaction of 
the present administration."154 Even Jefferson's most vociferous critics could 
see the benefits. 
Only after the precise terms of the treaty became known did New 
Englanders begin to fear its consequences. The criticism centered on the 
disadvantages to the northern states. The Herald worried that the purchase 
would lead to considerable emigration from east to west. 155 In other 
northern newspapers, critics complained about the deal's expense, arguing 
that it would cost nearly all of the gold and silver coins in the United States 
and would be funded ''not on the ,gilt carriages of Virginians, or on the 
whiskey of Kentucky and Tennessee; but on the opulence of the middle, the 
industry and enterprise of the northern states~"156 Those who opposed the 
treaty also thought it poor foreign policy. The Federalists believed that 
152. 
153. 
1986). 
DECONDE, supra note 2, at 171. 
1 HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 358 (Library of America 
154. NEWBURYPORT HERALD, july 1, 1803; HaiVey Putnam Prentiss, Timothy Pickering as 
the Leader of New England Federalism (1932) (unpublished dissertation, Northwestern 
University). 
155. NEWBURYPORT HERALD, Aug. 6, 1803. 
156. SALEM GAZETTE, Aug. 16, 1803. See also COLUMBIA SENTINEL, July 20, 1803. 
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Republican plans to expand the Union westward were foolish because the 
result would be a huge, sparsely populated nation unable to govern itself or 
h . b d 157 I h. d. S muster t e resources necessary to secure Its or ers. n Is tary, . enator 
William Plumer articulated these concerns, writing that "[a] n extension of 
the body politic will enfeeble the circulation of its powers [and] energies in 
h . , 158 . t e extreme parts. · 
Moreover, Federalists suspected that France stood to benefit more than 
the United States, and that the treaty had been not a little the result of 
Jefferson and his Republican friends' love of France and its radical version 
of democracy. 159 Such suspicions· were easily aroused in Federalists, who 
nearly always favored closer relations with Britain than France. One 
newspaper published a memo by Livingston containing anti-British 
references, and some had described Livingston as a ''rankjac~bin." 160 In the 
Columbian Centinel, "Fabricus" saw the purchase as evidence of the power of 
French influence in the United States.161 By making such a deal with France, 
the U.S. had become a tool in the imminent war between France and Great 
. . . 
Britain. 162 This was also the sentiment of the young Federalist political 
leaders. Fisher Ames called the transaction "mean and despicable" and 
believed that Monroe and Livingston willingly played into the hands of the 
French. 163 "The cession of Louisiana," wrote George Cabot to Rufus King, 
was like "selling us a ship after she is surrounded by a British fleet. It puts 
into safe keeping what she could not keep herself .... "164 
Still, the attention of the Federalist community focused most closely on 
Article Ill, requiring the incorporation of the territory into the Union, 
which all assumed meant the admission of new states in the South and West. 
The loss of political influence would be so profound that the nature of the 
union itself had been irrevocably thanged. 165 In August, the Ner.vhuryport 
157. SeeOnuf, Expanding Union, supra note 18, at 74. 
158. See WILLIAM PLUMER'S MEMORANDUM OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, 
1803-1807, at 6 (Everett Somerville Browned., 1923) [hereinafter PLUMER]. 
159. See MALONE, supra note 2, at 295~96. Of course, Napoleon would not have been willing 
to sell Louisiana were he not convinced it was the best he could do for France. He perceived~ 
quite correctly, that the Jefferson administration had been engineering· a potential 
rapprochement with Britain, and he felt something needed to be done quickly to halt it. ld. at 
294-95. By .ceding Louisiana, Napoleon would remove the one area of conflict between the U.S. 
and France. !d. In addition, Napoleon's earlier plans to send a military expedition to Louisiana 
had gone up in srnoke when yellow fever dechnated the contingent of French soldiers in St. 
Dorningo who had been assigned the task. MCDONALD, supra note 2, at 63-67. 
160. MALONE, supra note 2,, at 298. 
] 61. THE COLUMBIAN CENTINEL,july 20, 1803. 
162. /d., July 23, 1803 ("Who does not sicken at such baseness and folly? To give tnone.y to 
France at this ti1ne is to strengthen the world's worst foe at a moment when its best friends are 
entitled to every help.''-). 
163. ] WORKS OF FISHER AMES 323 (Seth Ames ed., 1854) [hereinafter AMES]. 
. . . 
164. HENRY CABOT LODGE, LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE CABOT 331 (1877). 
165. Prentiss, supra note 154, at 69. 
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Herald had declared that "the cession of Louisiana will cause, in effect, a 
Revolution in our country, and a complete alteration of its political powers 
and in.fluences must take place. "166 According to "a Merchant" in the Atlantic 
Daily Advertiser that November, the treaty had <::aused_ "an unfortunate 
change in the system of our policy, if not in our form of government.''167 
Although these complaints made clear the widespread alarm about loss of 
political influence, they never articulated a cogent theory as to why it should 
be unconstitutional. 
That task was for William Plumer of New Hampshire, a young, reform-
minded Federalist leader in the United States Senate who, along with John 
Quincy Adams and others, sought to remake the Federalists into a more 
popularly oriented party.168 ln his diary, Plumer set forth in some detail what 
he saw as the constitutional problems with Article III of the treaty many of 
them the ones that, during the same period, troubled jefferson. 
First, Plumer focused on the assumption, shared by Federalist 
colleagues, that Louisiana was in essence a foreign country. Wondering why 
Napoleon had insisted on the provision in the treaty requiring 
incorporation, Plumer mused "that their admission would create an 
influence in his favor in the Councils of our nation. What could induce our 
Ministers to agree to an article in direct opposition to the spirit [and] genius 
of our Constitution?"169 The Constitution, Plumer believed, never 
contemplated "the accession of a foreign people," and the New States Clause 
only applied to the existing territory of the United States when the 
C . . .fi d 170 onstituuon was rau te . 
Plumer then advanced the balance of forces view of federalism through 
the metaphor of a trading company. Just as a firm could not admit new 
partners without the consent of each of the old partners, Plumer reasoned, 
neither can a new state "formed from without the limits of the original 
territory'' be admitted ''into the Union without the previous consent of each 
S "171 T · . f £ . b d . d b tate. o perm•t provinces o a ore1gn country to -e a m1tte y treaty 
would "immediately change both the forms [and] the principles of our 
government" because "the influences and votes of the old states would be 
controuled and negatived by the new.'' 172 "If we can admit Louisiana," he 
166. NEWBURYPORT HERALD, Aug. 9, 1803. 
167. THE NEWBURYPORT HERALD, Nov. 25, 1803. The Salem Gazette had reasoned earlier that 
month that " [ t] he weightiest argument against [the treaty] is not the money price, but ... that 
it would drain the population, and injure the interests, of the present confederacy. The 
Western People dance on account of the purchase; but the Atlantic States must pay the piper." 
SALEM GAZETTE, Nov. 15, 1803. 
168. DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, THE REVOLUTION OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: THE 
FEDERALIST PAR1Y lN THE ERA OF jEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 44-45 (1965). 
169. PLUMER, supra note 158, at 7. 
170. Id. 
171. !d. at 8. 
172. ld. at 8-9 (emphasis in original). 
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concluded, "why not the British provinces, why not the tenible Republic of 
France itself!"173 Admitting Louisiana "of itself a worlr!' would "destroy 
with a single operation the whole weight [and] importance of the eastern 
• h. l f t• . "174 states In t e sea eo po ttlcs. 
Next, Plumer compared the addition of new states required by th.e 
Louisiana treaty and the potential use of the treaty power that had most 
troubled Anti-Federalists in the state ratifying conventions. 
If the President [and] Senate can by treaty purchase new territory 
[and] stipulate that it shall be incorporated into the Union, 
without the previous consent of each of the old States why may 
they not by treaty, sell a State, [and] sever it from the union, 
without its consent? 
ln making this argument, Plumer returned to the basis of fears that 
' 
animated criticism of the .treaty· power from the beginnin.g. The Northerners 
now thought of something like Patrick· Henry's mathematical possibilities 
whereby a supermajority of states could bargain away the rights of western 
states to navigate on the Mississippi River through the treaty power. 175 This 
time, however, the shoe was on the oth,er foot. It was the New Englanders 
who imagined that their votes in the Senate would be swamped by the tide of 
votes from the Senators of the new, Republican western states. 
Moreover, new slaveholding states in the South and West would enjoy 
disproportionate power in the House of Representatives and in the Electoral 
College due to the operation of the Three-Fifths Clause, which counted 
slaves as three-fifths of a person for purposes of representation.176 As early as 
1803, "New York and New England had about sixty thousand more free 
inhabitants than did the entire slaveholding South, yet the South had 
thirteen more s-eats in the House of Representatives and twenty-one more 
electoral votes."177 This imbalance would increase if the Louisiana Territory 
were incorporated. 178 Despite the good fortune for the nation as a whole, the 
impact upon individual states would be powetful. The fears about the treaty 
power that haunted Anti-Federalists during the Convention had returned. 
C. THE POWER TO ACQUIRE 'TERRITORY 
In October of 1803, Jefferson presented the treaty to the Senate for 
ratification, a task that was accomplished in four days. 179 Aftetwards, 
173. /d. at 9. 
174. PLUMER, supra note 158, at 9 (emphasis in original). 
175. See supra notes 44-66 and accompanying text (discussing fears that the Treaty Glattse 
granted to the federal government powers that are too broad). 
176. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2, d. 3. 
· 177. MCDONALD, supra note 11, at 60. 
178. ld. 
179. CURRIE, supra note 2, at 95. 
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Jefferson invited the House and the Senate to enact implementing 
legislation, seeking to allay one of the significant concerns expressed by 
opponents during the debate over the Jay Treaty. 180 The implementing 
legislation authorized the President to take possession of the province, 
appropriated money, and extended federal statutes to the new territory. 
Congress divided the area into two parts: south ·of the thirty-third parallel, 
the present northern border of the state of Louisiana, would be the territory 
of Orleans. North of that line would be the Louisiana Territory. 181 The 
. fi . 1· 1 1· 182 ratt tcation vote sp 1t a ong party tnes~ 
But even before the congressional debates, Jefferson conducted his own 
debate with his conscience and with his closest advisors. The first issue 
PresidentJefferson confronted, when he learned of France;s offer to sell the 
Louisiana territory, was whether the federal government could 
constitutionally admit new territory into the United States. This issu.e proved 
to be the less problematic, and while Jefferson had reservations about it, the 
consensus view -even given the relatively strict interpretation of federal 
power common at the time was that the foreign affairs powers of the 
national government included the ability to acquire territory because it was a 
necessary part of conducting foreign policy. Thus the treaty power clearly 
included the power to acquire territory. 
The Constitution does not explicitly vest the federal government with 
the power to acquire new territory. However, Article Four, section three 
provides for the admission of new states into the Union.183 The Articles of 
Confederation, in Article Eleven, had provided for the automatic admission 
of Canada into the union, but "no other colony shall be admitted into the 
same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine states."184 
Evidence from the Convention suggests that some, though certainly not 
all, of the Framers believed new states would only be carved out of the 
180. ld. For a discussion of the Republicans' Criticism of the Jay Treaty, see supra notes 89-
103 and accompanying text. 
181. /d. 
182. BROWN, supra note 2, at 13. 
183. U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 3, cl. 1 
New states may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new States 
shall be fonned or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State 
be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the 
Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. 
ld. Another potential textual source for the power to acquire territory is the subsequent clause, 
authorizing Congress to "dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting 
territory or other property belonging to the United States ... " U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, d. 2. 
But there is no evidence that the Framers had the acquisition of territory in mind when drafting 
this clause. In Sere v. Pitqt, 10 U.S. (2 Cranch) 332, 336 (1810), Chiefjustice Marshall, writing 
for the Supreme Court, assumed that Congress possessed the power to acquire territory and 
looked to this clause simply to confirtn that Hthe power of governing and of legislating for a ., 
territory is the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire and to hold territory." 
184. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION, art. XI. 
• 
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existing territory of the United States. Edmund Randolph's "Propositions in 
the Federal Convention," known as . the "Virginia Plan," called for the 
"admission of states lawfully arising within the limits of the United States. ';185 
An early report of the Committee of Detail proposed that new states 
soliciting for admission into the United States "must be within the present 
limits of the United States,"186 although the word "present" was omitted from 
a later report.l87 By contrast, Patterson's New Jersey Pia~ merely stated that 
"provision ought to be made for the admission of new . states into the 
U . "188 N d. d Al d H ·1 ; 1 . 1· d · h. l" . . 189 nton. . or · 1 exan er . amt ton s p an Inc .u e t · JS Imitation. 
The draft of the Constitution reported by the Committee of Five 
• 
imposed the tightest restrictions on the admission of new.states. It contained 
. : 
an article providing that new states "lawfully constitute~ or established within 
the limits of the United States, may be admitted by the legislature into this 
government; but to such admission the consent of two-thirds of the 
members present in each house shall be necessary~"190 This language most 
closely resembles the text of Article Four, section three. Obviously, however, 
the final language contains no two-thirds majority requirement and, 
importantly, imposes no territorial limitation. Gouverneur Morris said that 
the ·ch1use was left vague on purpose, deferring more precise interpretation 
of the· phrase for later.191 
The question was still unresolved when Jefferson first considered 
proposing a deal with France to buy New Orleans and Florida so that the 
U.S. could. effectively control the Mississippi River. Jefferson knew that 
expanding the territory of the United States was politically complicated, so 
he asked his cabinet for advice. Attorney General Levi Lincoln wrote to 
Jefferson suggesting a means by which the question could be avoided:' the 
existing ·State of Georgia and the Territory of Mississippi would simply 
expand their borders to include the desired territory along the Mississippi to 
New Orleans, thus abrogating the need for the fede,ral government itself to 
185. 
at 22. 
186. 
187. 
• 
~ ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 52, at 144-45; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 49, 
See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 49, 14 7. 
ld. at 173. 
188. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 52, at 177. 
189. BROWN, supra note 2, at 16. 
190. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 52, at 229_;30 (emphasis added). 
191. BROWN, supra, note 2, at 16. In THE FEDERALIST No .. 43, Madison said only that it made 
sense to provide for the admission of new states and to protect existing ones against involuntary 
alteration. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison), supra note 15, at 273-74. The acquisition 
of new territory probably was not much on the Framers' minds. The greatest controversy in the 
discussion of the New States Clause was whether it permitted the existing states to be divided. 
For analysis of the meaning of the Clause with respect to this thorny problem, see Michael 
Stokes Paulson & Vasan Kesavan, Is West Virginia Constitutional?, 90 CAL. L. REv. 291, 334-95 
(2002). See also Kesavan, supra note 25. 
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acquire territory. 192 "By this indirect mode," he wrote to Jefferson, "would 
not the General Govt avoid some constitutional, and some political 
embarrassments, which a direct acquisition of a foreign territory by the Govt 
of the United States might occasion?~'193 
As a New Englander; Lincoln was in the best position to predict the 
nature of the opposition from the northern states to the federal 
government's acquisition of, and creation of new states from, the purchased 
territory. He reminded Jefferson of the balance of forces federalism costs. ''Is 
there not danger," he wrote, that the northern states would object 
to the ratification of a treaty directly introducing a state of things, 
involving the idea of adding to the weight of the Southern States in 
one branch of the Govt of which there is already too great jealousy 
[and] dread, while they would acquiesce in that increase of the 
other branch consequent on the enlargement of the boundaries of 
St t ?194 a a e. 
Lincoln's implication was that expanding the representation of 
so_uthern states in the House of Representatives was preferable to adding 
southern seats in the Senate, which could be coerced by some future 
President into further expanding by treaty the nation's borders southward, 
thus adding new slave states indefinitely: 
. 
The principles, and the precedent, of an indepen·dent purchase of 
territory~ it will be said, may be extended to the East or West Indies, 
and that some future executive, will extend them, to the purchase 
of Louisiana, or still further south, [and] become the Executive of 
the United States of North and South America. 195 
Even though northern states wanted access to the Mississippi River, Lincoln 
concluded, they would not be willing to pay so high a price for it. 196 
But Treasury Secretary Gallatin rejected Lincoln's idea, arguing to 
Jefferson that there was, in terms of the constitutional difficulties, "no 
difference between a power to acquire territory for the United States and the 
power to extend by treaty the territory of the United States."197 The issue 
must be faced head-on, Gallatin thought, and he reasoned that the power to 
acquire territory derived from the treaty power itself. He noted that the 
clause providing for the admission of new states did not require that new 
states be catved from existing territories of the U.S., nor did the provision 
192. Letter from Levi Lincoln to Thomas Jefferson, in BROWN supra note 2, at 18. 
193. /d.at19. 
194. /d. 
195. !d. at 20. 
196. /d. 
197. 1 ALBERT GALLATIN, WRITINGS 111-14 (Henry Adams ed., 1879) (emphasis added). 
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granting Congress the power to legislate for the territories refer specifically 
' h . . . 198 to t e extsttng territory. 
Jefferson responded to this analysis by returning to the principle of 
strict construction. Although he appears to have at first cautiously approved 
of Gallatin;s argument with regard to the acquisition of territory, Jefferson 
clearly balked at the id~a of admitting new states formed from that territory 
into the union: 
You are right, in my opinion ... [that] there is no constitutional 
difficulty as to the acquisition of territory, and whether, when 
acquired, it may be taken into the Union by the Constitution as it 
now stands, will become a question of expediency. I think it will be 
safer ·not to permit the enlargement of the Union but by 
d f h. c . . 199 amen ment o t e onstttutton. 
If the text did not so pro~de, it generally should not be done. 
Once it became known that Napoleon was willing to sell all of 
Louisiana, Jefferson became even more convinced, concluding that a 
constitutional amendment was necessary both to acquire territory and to 
form new states from it~ What probably cemented jefferson's feelings on the 
issue was the enormous size of the territory to be acquired from France, 
which, according to historian Dumas Malone, "magnified and accentuated 
the constitutional question [s] ."200 Jefierson saw in the vast territory the 
potential transformation of national politics with the addition of new states . 
• . . 
At any rate, he announced his conviction th~t a constitutional amendment 
was required in communication with a number of people, including his son-
in-law Thomas Randolph; prominent Virginian politician William Dunbar; 
renowned Massachusetts antilegalist Benjamin Austin; elder statesman John 
' 
Dickinson, who had worked with Jefferson on the Declaration of 
Independence; the rising Republican congressional star, Kentuckian John 
Breckinridge; and even, apparently, the Federalist William Plumer.201 
Because the treaty was ratified and implewented so quickly, opponents 
' 
of the treaty did not have time publicly to express their views regarding the 
constitutionality of acquiring territory.202 However, a few Federalists 
expressed serious doubts privately, and along the lines predicted by Attorney 
General Line-oln. Manasseh Curler and George Cabot warned that the 
admission of new territory to the South and West would diminish the 
198. Id. • 
199. Letter from Thomas Jetierson to Albert Gallatin Uanuary 1803), in 8 jEFFERSON 
WRITINGS,.supra note 4; at 241 n.L 
200. MALONE, supra note 2, at 313. 
201. See BROWN, supra note 2, at 23-25. 
202. CURRIE, supra note 2, at 101. 
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influence of New England.203 Fisher Ames complained that, by adding 
territory beyond the Mississippi River, "we rush like a comet into infinite 
space. In -our wild career, we may jostle some other world out of its orbit, but 
we shall, in every event, quench the light of our own."204 Senator Plumer 
expressed doubts in his diary, writing that, "The constitution of the United 
States was formed for the ,express purpose of governing the people who then 
& thereafter should live within the limits of the United States as then known 
& established. It never contemplated the accession of a foreign people, or 
the extension of _territory.''205 Yet later in the same diary entry, Plumer 
seemed to admit that the United States probably did have the power to 
acquire territory, either by conquest or acquisition.206 
Perhaps the most candid assessment of the Framers' intent came from 
Gouverneur Morris, who wrote that, when drafting the New States Clause, 
the strongest reason against adding language restricting the future territory 
' 
of the United States had been the fact that it would fly in the face of public 
demand~ "I knew as well then as I do now," Morris wrote, ~'that all North 
America must at length be annexed to us. It would, therefore, have been 
perfectly Utopian to oppose a paper restriction to the violence of popular 
sentiment in a popular government."207 Sharing the popularview,Jefferson's 
advisors and friends did not seem to agree with him that the treaty power 
could not extend to even the acquisition of territory.208 
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized in 1828 that the federal 
government has the power the acquire territory as an adjunct to its authority 
to conduct foreign policy. 209 In American Insurance Company v. Canter, Chief 
Justice Marshall declared that "(t]he Constitution confers absolutely on the 
Government of the Union the powers of making war, and of making treaties; 
consequently, that Government possesses th-e power of acquiring territory, 
either by conquest or by treaty."210 Indeed, a supporter of the Jefferson 
administration had justified· the acquisition of the Louisiana Territory strictly 
in foreign policy terms: had the French maintained control of Louisiana and 
. 
colonized it further, the United States would have been forced to maintain a 
203. See George Cabot to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 10-, 1803), in LODGE, supra note l64t at 
333-34; Manasseh Cutler to Dr. Torrey (Oct. 31, 1803), in 2 CUTLER & CUTLER,. supra note 13, 
at 138. 
204. Letter from Fisher Ames to Christopher Gore (Oct. 3, 1803), in 1 AMES, supra note 
163, at 323--24). 
205. See PLUMER, supra note 158, at 7. 
206~ Id. at 12. 
207. 3 jARED SPARKS, THE LIFE OF GoUVERNEUR MORRIS 185 (1832). 
208. See MALONE, supra note 2, at 314. However, as noted above; New Englander Attorney 
General Levi Lincoln shared jefferson's doubts. See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text. 
209. Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter~ 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). 
• 
210. Id; see also 3 STORY, supra note 28, § 1282 ("As an incidental power, the constitutional 
right of the United States to acquire territory would seem so naturally to flow from the 
' 
sovereignty confided to it, as not to admit of very serious question."). · 
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standing army along the lengthy mutual border.211 Jefferson's reservations 
about this power, however, particularly when he learned of the size of the 
purchase, undoubtedly stemmed from the likely result of the acquisition-
the incorporation of Louisiana into the United States as states. 
D. THE PO~"'R TO INCORPORATE FO&/GN TERRITORY AS STAT~"'S 
When the Louisiana Treaty was concluded, most believed that the 
United States had the power under the Treaty Clause to acquire foreign 
territory in order to secure its own borders and preserve access to the 
Mississippi River. This power arguably flowed from the need of any 
sovereign nation to defend itself. But once the newly-acquired territory 
opened for settlement, the inquiry shifted from the scope of the national 
government's foreign affairs power to an alternative power to alter the 
domestic relationship among the states, and thus to transform the nature of 
the Union itself. Settlement inevitably meant new states, and new states 
would mean new Senators and Representatives in Congress. Knowledgeable 
observers could easily see dozens of new states emerging from this huge 
territory, and the Federalists of New England accurately feared that the new 
states would be Republican, and that they would side with the interests of 
the South. 
This subpart examines whether the treaty clause provided the federal 
government authority to incorporate new states from foreign territory a 
question that not only divided Republicans and Federalists, but also divided 
Jefferson himself. 
• 
1. The Debate in Congress 
Facing a popular president with strong majorities in both houses of 
Congress, the Federalists needed to persuade some of their Republican 
colleagues that the treaty would violate the Constitution. The Republicans 
would have none of it. They simply demurred, claiming that these issues 
needed to be resolved later. That may have been because the Federalists' 
balance of forces concerns eerily echoed the alarms raised by the Republicans 
during the ratification debates. 
What is striking about the debate in Congress on the treaty and the 
implementing legislation is the degree to which the Republican majority 
failed to engage the major substantive constitutional questions raised by the 
Federalists. During the treaty's ratification debate in the Senate, not a single 
Republican Senator took the position that the Constitution allowed for the 
admission of new states outside the original territory of the United States.212 
The strategy that these Senators adopted was simply to deny that the treaty 
211. See DAVID RAMSAY, AN ORATION ON THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO THE UNITED STATES 
14 (1804). 
212. CURRIE, supra note 2, at 1470. 
STATES' RIGHTS AND THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE 383 
required statehood. Virginia Senator John Taylor observed that "the words 
are literally satisfied by incorporating [Louisiana]- into the Union as a 
. d s ,21 3 ' territory, an not as a tate. 
That the Republicans would choose to avoid the issue of whether the 
Louisiana Treaty itself actually had the effect of bringing the new territory 
. . 
into the Union as states is not surprising. During the debate on the Jay 
Treaty, they insisted that the House of Representatives have a role in 
choosing whether and how to implement the changes in domestic and 
commercial law required by that treaty. 214 In their analysis, if a . treaty 
involved matters within the purview .of Congress, then both houses of 
Congress needed to be consulted.215 Similarly, in the case of the Louisiana 
Treaty, Congress's power to admit new states into the Union required that 
' 
any treaty calling for the admission of new states. could not take effect 
without the approval of Congress.. . 
This proved to be a distinction without a difference. 216 Once the treaty 
became the law of the land, the admission of new states was a fait accompli. 
Mter ratification, the Federalist's fears were confirmed; the treaty tied their 
hands with regard to the ultimate admission of new states, and slave states in 
particular. In a letter to Timothy Pickering, Rufus King asked if the 
Executive could admit states by treaty or enter into an agreement binding 
Congress to do so, which amounts to the same thing. Moreover, he asked, 
"as Slavery is authorized. & exists in Louisiana, and the treaty engages to 
protect the Property of the inhabitants, will not the present inequality, arising 
from the Representation of Slaves, be increased?"217 Pickering ·was 
pessimistic. He believed that Jefferson and his fellow Republicans had not 
even bothered to claim that the Constitution permitted incorporation of 
' 
• 
' 
' 
213. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 51 (1803). This was at best a technical argument designed to 
' 
deflect serious debate, and a dubious one given Republican protestations during the Jay Treaty 
controversy. See supra Part III. Still, at least one Federalist believed that the treaty was legal and 
could be later sanctioned with a constitutional amendment. Senator John Quincy Adams 
acknowledged that the treaty was valid even if the federal governtnent did not have the power 
to admit Louisiana as a state; consent of the states could be obtained later if it was required. See 
id. at 58-59. However, Adams certainly must have realized that he was mistaken when his 
attempts to ratify the treaty with a constitutional amendment went nowhere. See infra notes 283-
85 and accompanying text. 
214. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text. 
215. See id. 
. 
216. As became clear in Missouri v. Holland, Congress has the same power ·under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to carry out the treaty provisions as the Senate and the President 
have in negotiating treaties. Missouri actually concerned the constitutionality of the legislation 
implementing the Migratory Bird Treaty. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 432 ("If the treaty is valid 
there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article I, section 8, as a necessary 
and proper means to execute the powers of the Government."). 
217. 4 KING, supra note 12, at 324 (emphasis added). 
384 88 IOWA LAW REVIEW [2003] 
new territory into the Union as states. But the admission of new states was 
. . bl h h . . h d b . d 218 tnevtta e now t at t e terrttory a . · een acquire . 
Expressing similar fears, Gouverneur Morris wrote to Livingston that 
Louisiana should be governed as a province with "no voice in our 
councils."219 He recalled that he had never thought it wise, when the New 
States Clause was drafted, for states to be formed from new territory even 
Canada, which the Articles of Confederation had clearly anticipated could 
become a state. He did acknowledge, however, that putting such a limitation 
into the language of the New States Clause in Article IV would have 
provoked strong opposition. 220 Nonetheless, Morris believed that, with the 
admission of so many new states, "the Constitution cannot last, and an 
unbalanced monarchy will be established in its ruins."221 
The constitutionality of the treaty occupied the House of 
Representatives' attention when it went into the Committee of the Whole to 
consider implementing legislation. New York Representative Gaylord 
Griswold observed that the Louisiana Treaty clearly called for the 
incorporation of the territory into the U~nited States, something which the 
Constitution simply did not give the President and the Senate the power to 
do. In fact, he added, the power could not be found anywhere in the text of 
the Constitution, and th.e framers clearly had not intended an addition of 
territory large enough as possibly to "overbalance the existing territory. "222 
However, if the power was lodged anywhere, it was with the Congress, and 
Jefferson had usurped Congress's power by making a treaty that had the 
effect of admitting new states.223 It was thus incumbent on Congress to reject 
the treaty because it was unconstitutional; even a beneficial measure, if it 
violated the Constitution, should be resisted.224 
In their response to Griswold and the Federalists, the Republicans 
shrewdly deferred consideration of the substantive objections. First, they 
insisted that, since Jefferson had submitted the treaty to Congress for 
implementation, those aspects of the treaty that fell within the putview of 
Congress would not take effect without Congressional approval. And surely, 
the highly partisan floor leader John Randolph added, the President, "as the 
organ by which we communicate with [foreign states], must be the prime 
agent, in negotiating such an acquisition~"225 Thus, the Republicans could 
argue a position at least ostensibly consistent with the one they had taken 
during the debate on the Jay Treaty. 
218. BROWN, supra note 2, at 43. 
219. 3 SPARKS, supra note 207, at 192. 
220. /d. 
221. /d. 
222. 13 ANNALS OF CONC. 433 (1803). 
223. !d. at 433. 
224. /d. at 432-. 
225 ., /d., at 436. 
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Yet Randolph conceded even more: he reassured Federalists by insisting 
that provisions of the treaty that exceeded the constitutional power of the 
federal government in general would not take effect at all, absent a 
constitutional amendment.226 His Republican colleague Nicholson pointed 
out that the 1783 Treaty with Great Britain contained a provision requiring 
the states to honor pre-war debts. Since the states had plenary power over 
the recovery of debt, that provision never took effect.227 Of course, the 1783 
Treaty was negotiated under the Articles of Confederation, before the states 
fully delegated the treaty power to the federal government. Randolph's 
reassurances did not persuade Griswold, who argued that a promise in the 
treaty to add states amounted in principle to incorporation.228 
On the Senate side, many Republicans also insisted that the treaty did 
not require that the new territory be admitted as states. John Taylor found 
that the words of Article III of the Louisiana Treaty "are literally satisfied by 
incorporating them into the Union as a territory, and not as a State."229 
Senator Smilie of Pennsylvania made the point that the constitutionality of 
Article III need not be resolved, saying that, if the principles of the 
Constitution forbade the admission of Louisiana into the Union, the 
solution was a constitutional amendment, and until one was approved the 
. ld . "' 1. . 1 "230 Wh h h territory cou remain tn a co on1a state. et er t ese arguments were 
sincerely raised is doubtful: they were clearly contrary to the policy of the 
administration favoring statehood and Jefferson's own strongly-held views.231 
The Republicans' insistence that the treaty would not require the 
incorporation of states did have the virtue of enabling them to attack the 
Federalists as inconsistent. A number of Federalists argued that the treaty 
1 d th . . . f . 232 B h power cou never encompass e acqutsitJ.on o any territory. ut ot ers, 
such as Senator White of Delaware, said that, while the U.S. could acquire 
the port of New Orleans and other areas necessary_ to control the Mississippi, 
"Louisiana, this new, immense, unbounded world, if it should ever be 
incorporated into this Union, which I have no idea can be done but by 
altering the Constitution, I believe it will be the greatest curse that could at 
present befall us." 233 Republicans, who willfully did not distinguish between 
acquiring territory and incorporating it as states, made great hay out of this 
difference of opinion. But what truly united Federalists was the shift in the 
balance of power between regions likely to result once new states were 
admitted. 
226. Id. 
227~ 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 468-69 (1803). 
228. /d. 
229. /d. at 50-51. 
230. /d. at 457-58. 
231. See supra Part N.A. 
232. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 457-58 (1803). 
233. /d. 
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The Senate Federalists took a hard line against the treaty based on the 
compact theory of states' rights that Plumer had expressed in his diary.234 
The firebrand Senator Timothy Pickering argued during the debate that 
even a constitutional amendment would not make the· treaty acceptable. 
Such a significant expansion of the nation could not be effected without the 
unanimous consent of the existing ·states .. He believed that "the assent of 
each individual State to be necessary for the admission of foreign country as 
an associate in the Union; in like manner as in a commercial house, the 
consent of each member would be necessary to admit a new partner into the 
235 
company." 
The problem with this argument was that the text of the Constitution 
did not support it. It was one thing to say that the treaty exceeded the 
enumerated powers of the national government; it was another to impose a 
special requirement . found nowhere in the Constitution that the consent 
of every existing state be obtained. Instead, the logical answer was a 
constitutional amendment, and that was exactly what Jefferson had already 
proposed. 
2. Jefferson and His Advisors 
When Congress met to ratify the treaty and enact the implementing 
legislation, the more important debate had already occurred elsewhere-
within the Jefferson Administration. For Jefferson, the treaty presented the 
same constitutional problems the Federalists had identified. He firmly 
believed that ratifying the treaty was an. extra-constitutional act. In the end, 
Jefferson and the Congressional Republicans both decided to avoid publicly 
engaging the constitutional questions, but for different reasons. Most 
Republicans thought it was not necessary; in marked contrast, Jefferson 
believed that the exigencies of the moment required him to remain silent 
despite profound misgivings. 
While historians excuse, on practical and legal grounds, Jefferson's 
failure to pursue a constitutional amendment, they overlook the balance of 
forces federalism implications of the treaty that may have motivated those 
doubts., A constitutional amendment was nec€ssary because the Louisiana 
Treaty altered the relationship between individual states and the federal 
government. The treaty lead to the admission of states with interests 
opposed to those of many of the existing states and extended the operation 
... 
of the Three-Fifths Clause to more territory, upsetting the careful balance of 
power between North and South struck by the states that ratified the 
234. BROWN, supra note 2, at 69. For a discussion of Plumer's diary entry, see supra notes 
204-05 and accompanying text. 
235. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 44-45 (1803); see also id. at 73 (statement of Senator Thacher). 
Senatcir Tracy of Connecticut added that "the relative strength which this admission gives to a 
Southern and Western interest, is contradictory to the principles of our original Union." Id at 
54-56. 
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Constitution. The individual states' status as sovereigns required that they 
assent to such a drastic change in the nature of the union. Growing 
• 
resentment in New England, and confusion and bitterness surrounding the 
spread of slavery in the new territory, would result from the failure to 
properly execute this constitutional change. 
Even though his party now controlled two of the three branches of the 
national government and the third, the judiciary, had just begun to assert 
its power Jefferson was still subject to the checks and balances of his own 
conscience. Jefferson clearly shared the Federalists' concerns about the 
admission of foreign territory as states, and privately he expressed those 
concerns in a similar fashion. He shared these doubts with most of his 
closest friends and advisors, starting from the moment he received news of 
the treaty.236 But one of the administration's most influential members, 
Treasury Secretary Gallatin, had already anticipated the concerns about the 
incorporation of states earlier that year in response to Jefferson's query 
about the acquisition of territory.237 Gallatin's long, elegant response showed 
how it was easy to think that the incorporation of states from new territory 
flowed naturally from the various powers of the national government: 
The existence of the United States as a nation presupposes the 
power enjoyed by every nation ·of extending their territory by 
treaties, and the general power given to· the President and Senate 
of making treaties designates the organ through which the 
acquisition may be made~ whilst this section [Article IV, section 
three] provides the proper authority (viz. Congress) for either 
admitting in the Union or governing as subjects the territory thus 
. d 238 acquire . 
Gallatin then reminded Jefferson that the New States Clause was 
designed to replace a provision in the Articles of Confederation, which had 
• 
anticipated the admission of Canada a territory outside the current 
boundaries of the United States.239 
236. See BROWN, supra note 2, at 23-24. 
237. CURRIE, supra note 2, at 8 n.30. Albert Gallatin was, along with Madison, Jefferson's 
closest advisor; together the three men formed the "triumvirate" that Henry Adams said ran the 
Jefferson Administration. Adams called Gallatin a "perfect model of statesmanship." /d. 
238. /d. 
239. /d.; see also Letter from Wilson Cary Nicholas to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 3, 1803), in 
BROWN, supra note 2, at 26-27: 
I find the power as broad as it could well be made ... except that new States 
cannot be fonned out of the old ones without the consent of the State to be 
dismembered; and the exception is a proof to my mind that it was not intended to 
confine the congress in the admission of new States to what was then the territory 
of the U.S. 
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This answer never satisfied Jefferson, and Gallatin himself ·later 
acknowledged doubts.240 Gallatin's structural argument Jefferson answered 
most elo.quently in a famous letter to one of his closest confidants, Senator 
Nicholas. The letter is worth quoting at some length. First, he entertained 
the absurd results from a broad construction: 
[W]hen I consider that the limits of the US are precisely fixed by 
the treaty of 1783 ... I cannot help believing that .the intention was 
to permit Congress to admit into the Union new States, which 
should be formed out of the territory for which, & under whose 
authority alone, they were then acting. I do not believe it was 
meant that they might receive England, Ireland, Holland, &c. fnto 
. h. h ld b h . 241 . tt, w IC wou · e t e case on your construction. 
He also described the reasons for his belief in strict construction, which 
meant that, when in doubt, he would conclude that the government did not 
have the power to do something: 
When an instrument admits of two constructions, the one safe, the 
other dangerous, the one precise, the other indefinite, I prefer that 
which is safe & precise. I had rather ask an enlargement of power 
from the nation; when it is found necessary, than to assume by a 
construction which would make our powers boundless. 
Finally, in sweeping language that called to · mind his passionate 
invective against the treaty power during the Federalist administrations, he 
explained the importance of Constitutional change via the amendment 
process:, 
Our peculiar security is in possession of a written Constitution. Let 
us not make it .a blank paper by construction. I say the same as to 
the opinion of those who consider the grant of the treaty making 
power as boundless. If it is, then we have no Constitution .... 
Nothing is more likely than that their enumeration of powers is 
defective .... Let us go on then perfecting it; by adding, by way of 
amendment to the Constitution, those powers which time & trial 
show are still wanting .... I confess, then, I think it important, in 
the present case, to set an example against broad construction, by 
I. c h I 242 appea tng tOr new power to t e peop e. 
• 
240. "[N]ot even Congress can prevent some constitutional irregularity in the proceedings 
relative to occupying and governing the country before an amendment to the Constitution shall 
take place." 1 GALLATIN, supra note 197, at 158 (remarks on jefferson's address to Congress, 
Oct 4, 1 803). 
241. Letter from Thomas jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in 8 jEFFERSON 
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 247. 
242. Letter from Thomas jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in 8jEFFERSON 
WRJTINGS, supra note 4, at 24 7-48. 
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Jefferson's stirring letter to Nicholas was written after nearly two months 
spent discussing the problems and considering various constitutional 
amendments. He had in fact proposed an amendment as soon as the treaty 
arrived from France, writing to William Dunbar that Congress would be 
"obliged to ask from the People an amendment of the Constitution; 
authorizing their receiving the province into the Union, and providing for 
its government; and the limitations of p.ower which shall be given by that 
amendment, will be unalterable but by the same authority."243 While the 
Federalists proposed an impossible solution that the treaty would require 
the consent of every state Jefferson proposed to rely on the device 
.d d £ . h c . . . 244 provt e or In t e ·onstttution. 
Yet some historians portray Jefferson in this situation as merely an 
overzealous strict constructionist. To David N. Mayer, Jefferson's concerns 
were oddly technical.245 Since states n.ever had the pow.er to acquire or 
incorporate territory, Mayer argues, the treaty did not pose the kind of 
threat to federalism that animated Jefferson's abhorrence of implied 
national power and drove him to oppose, for example, the bill establishing 
the Bank of the United States.246 Rather, the consequences were merely 
political. Moreover, Jefferson had always espoused more flexibility in the 
realm of foreign affairs when it did not concern states' rights, and later on in 
his presidency, Jefferson and Congress imposed a total embargo without 
entertaining the slightest doubts as to its constitutionality.247 
But there are two reasons why the Louisiana Purchase was different. 
Fir~t, .it involved the use of th.e treaty power, which Jefferson had a special 
antipathy toward because of the ways in which its broad scope overlapped 
with the powers of Congress to legislate domestically. That is why Jefferson 
railed against the treaty power during the Jay Treaty debate and published a 
very narrow view of the power in the Senate Handbook of Parliamentary 
Practice.248 Second, Jefferson clearly understo,od, if he did not write 
explicitly, that the Louisiana Treaty, even more than the Jay Treaty before it, 
would have a tremendous impact on states' rights.-Attorney General Lincoln 
accurately predicted the passionate response of the New England 
243. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Dunbar Quly 17, 1803), in 8 JEFFERSON 
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 255. 
244. The promise of a constitutional amendment would have been an important tool for 
disanning the treaty's Federalist critics, and at least some segment of the public also believed 
that an amendment was required to admit, as states, territory :outside the original borders of the 
U.S. Before the treaty was announced, anonymous "Sylvestris" proposed an amendment to the 
Constitution permitting West Florida (to be purc;hased from Spain); the New Orleans territory, 
and the Mississippi Territory to enter the Union as a state. BROWN, supra note 2, at 37. 
245. MAYER, supra note 2, at 216-17. 
246. /d. at 215-16. 
247. /d. at 216-17. 
248. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (discussing the founders' debates 
concerning dangers ofthe treaty power). 
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Federalists, who feared the loss of influ_ence when new states were added to 
the South and West.249 In addition, maintaining the regional balance of 
power was the impetus for negotiating the treaty in the first place: though 
the end result was unexpected, it began as. an attempt to gain for western 
and southern states the access to the Mississippi River they felt they might 
lose amid treachery from northern states anxious to make treaties with Spain 
and France favorable to them~25o. 
Most historians describe the empire of liberty theory as if it represented 
the accepted view of states' rights without acknowledging the dissonant 
notes struck by the balance of forces theory. Mayer approvingly quotes Thomas 
Paine's argument to Jefferson that the Louisiana Purchase was "within the 
morality of the Constitution" because it did not alter the American system of 
republican government, but merely applied it to a muc·h larger geographical 
area.
251 It is true that jefferson himself sympathized with this view. Writing to 
a friend about the Louisiana Purchase in 1804, he said its greatest 
achievement was "this duplication of area for the extending a_ government so 
free and economical as ours."252 Mter all, it was Jefferson himself who had 
first referred to an "Empire of Liberty."253 
But the limitations of this empire of liberty theory are apparent. It is too 
abstract; it ignores the fact that the Constitution was and is a document 
designed to provide processes for governin_g a particular nation with its 
unique geographic and cultural circumstances. Since the Constitution was 
written so that it could win the approval of most legislatures in the original 
249. MALONE, supra note 2, at 321. 
250. See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of the treaty 
power). 
251. MAYER, supra note 2, at 251. 
252. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Priestly (Jan. 29, 1804)~ in 8 JEFFERSON 
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 294-95-. 
253. See ONUF, EMPIRE, supra note 18, at 65-70. Jefferson -first used the expression '~Empire 
of Liberty" in a letter to George Rogers Clark. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George 
Rogers Clark (Dec. 25,. 1780), in 2 jEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 390. Others have taken 
a similar view. The historian Everett Somerville Brown, who wrote the first in"!depth analysis of 
the constitutional questions raised by the Louisiana treaty; did not take a clear position on the 
constitutionality of its provisions. See generally BROWN, supra note 2. Nonetheless, Brown 
approvingly quoted James Madison, who, during the controversy over admitting Missouri into 
the Union, wrote to a friend that the significant issue with regard to admitting new states was 
simply whether they would be placed on an even footing with the existing states. Jd. at 48 
(quoting Letter frotn James Madison to Robert Wa1sh (Nov. 27, 1819), in 9 MADISON PAPERS, 
supra note 93, at 6-7). Brown assumes, like Mayer and Thomas Paine, that there was nothing 
offensive to the Constitution so long as new states were admitted on an even footing with the 
old. More recently, Professor David Currie distnissed most arguments against the legality of the 
treaty. See CURRIE, supra note- 2, at 103. For Currie, the seemingly broad nature of the New 
States Clause demonstrates the Framers, intent that states be admitted from newly-acquired 
territories. While Currie admits that the clause was written to account for the problem of 
existing territories, "there seems no more reason to limit it to those territories than to-hold that 
the Thirteenth Amendment protected only blacks from slavery.'' !d . 
• 
, 
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thirteen states, its structure resulted from a series of compromises among 
large and small states, South and North, with conflicting interests. For the 
Federalists,- the maintenance of balance and harmony among the sections, 
"the national compromise of regional and economic interests" were essential 
republican traits. 254 Timothy Pickering, in a speech to Congress, noted that 
the Constitution expressed exactly these qualities, since it was "the result of 
compromise of mutual sacrifices, of State interests, of local wishes, and 
d 255 attachments, to the common goo ." The balance of forces theory thus 
respects the hard-won, organic identity of the existing states. 
A close reading of Jefferson's plans for constitutional amendments 
reveals a deep concern, not only for states' rights in general, but for the 
balance of forces. Jefferson had always looked westward. As early as 1780, 
Jefferson had described the ''Empire of Liberty" as a continent-wide, 
decentralized, republican empire, free of corruption and made up of equal, 
autonomous states.256 However, the paradox at the heart of the "Empire of 
Liberty," Jefferson envisioned, was that its fruition depended not only on the 
expansion of the American Republic westward, but on the concomitant 
preservation of local autonomy and self-government, and therefore, states' 
rights~257 This meant respecting not only the rights of future potential states, 
but of the existing states as welL 
Although Jefferson never explicitly admitted it, his concerns indicate 
. . 
that he was aware of the problems with the "Empire of Liberty.'' The 
addition of at least several new states with new interests in one part of the 
nation, and in a territory equal to the size of the existing states, was bound to 
change the relationship between the federal government and the existing 
states. Jefferson understood this as well as any radical Federalist. As the 
historian Forrest McDonald points out, Jefferson knew that full 
incorporation of the entire Louisiana territory "would drastically alter the 
constitutional nature of the Union."258 Thus, his proposed constitutional 
amendments reveal that he at least considered it important, if not crucial, 
that the process of growth should be strictly controlled so that the nature of 
the Union would change gradually, and each time with the assent of the 
existing states, North and South. 
In drafting the amendments, Jefferson carefully considered the order 
and process by which this huge new territory sh,ould be brought into th-e 
Union. He frequently spoke of closing off to settlement the area west of the 
Mississippi River. He wrote to Horatio Gates that New Orleans and the 
surrounding settled area would, be annexed to the Mississippi Territory while 
254. BANNER, supra note 16, at 20. 
255. Jd. at 27. 
256-. 0NUF, EMPIRE, supra note 18, at 65-70. 
257. Id. at 64-65. 
258. McDONALD, supra note 2, at 70. 
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. • 259 the rest would be locked up from settlement and left to the Indians~ Navy 
Secretary Robert Smith, one of the advisors Jefferson consulted early on, 
assured him that a constitutional amendment co.uld prohibit Congress from 
establishing a new state or territorial government north of the thirty-third 
parallel, or granting anyone title to land in the territory. 260 
Yet jefferson knew that the settlement of the entire Louisiana Territory 
would eventually happen, so he devised a plan by w·hich states would be 
brought slowly into the union as the population achieved the proper 
density. 261 Once the eastern side of the Mississippi had been settled, 
presumably starting with New Orleans and working northward, settlements, 
and eventually statehood, would proceed in the opposite direction on the 
western side of the river, working from the headwaters of the Mississippi to 
the delta.262 This plan reflected a careful balancing of north and south; and 
potentially slave and non-slave, territories. 
Jefferson drafted amendments designed to take away from Congress, as 
much as possible, the manner in which the Louisiana Territory could be 
incorporated as states. Jefferson sent the first proposed amendment to his 
Cabinet for comment in July of 1803.263 As constitutional language, it seems 
preposterously bulky, but it reflected Jefferson's concern that Congress have 
as little wiggle rooffi as possible.264 It laid_ out in significant detail the powers 
259. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Horatio Gates Guly 11, 1803), in 8 JEFFERSON 
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 250-51. 
260. Letter from Robert Smith to Thotnas Jefferson (July 9,, 1803), in 8 JEFFERSON 
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 241-42. 
261. Letter from Thoma$ Jefferson to John C. Breckinridge (Aug. 12, 1803), in 8 JEFFERSON 
WRITINGS, supra note 4~ at 244. 
262. Id. 
263. See, ·e.g., BROWN, supra note 2, at 38; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin 
(July 9, 1803) in 8jEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 4, at 96. 
264. The proposed amendment is even too long to quote in its entirety, bot here is a 
• portion: 
The legislature of the Union shall have authority to exchange the right of 
occupancy in portions where the U.S. have full right for lands possessed by Indians 
within the U.S. on the East side of the Mississippi, [sic) to exchange lands on the 
East side of the river for those of the white inhabitants on the West side thereof 
and above the latitude of 31 degrees: to maintain in any part of the province such 
military posts as may be requisite for peace or safety: to exercise police over all 
persons therein, not being Indian inhabitants; to work salt springs, or mines of 
coal, metals and other minerals within the possession of the U.S. or in any others 
with the consent of the possessors; to regulate trade [and] intercourse between the 
Indians inhabitants and all other persons; to explore and ascertain the geography 
of the province, its productions and other interesting circumstances; to open roads 
and navigation therein when necessary for beneficial communication; [and] to· 
establish agencies and factories therein for the cultivation of commerce, peace and 
good understanding with the Indians residing there. 
Thomas jefferson, Draft Constitutional Amendment Quly 1803), in 8 jEFFERSON WRITINGS, 
supra note 4, at 243-48. 
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of Congress over the territory, which included the authority to explore the 
province, establish military posts, and build mines and roads. But 
significantly, it left the area west of the Mississippi above thirty-three degrees 
latitude to the Indians, who would maintain "[t]he rights of occupancy in 
the soil, and of selfgovernment.';265 The proposed amendment also denied 
Congress the power "to dispose of the lands of the province otherwise than 
* 
as hereinbefore permitted, until a ·new Amendment of the constitution shall 
. h h . ,,266 gtve t at aut onty. · 
This first amendment received a cool reception from Jefferson's 
advisors, who pointed out to him that it was far too long and complex to be 
workable.267 In response, Jefferson drafted a shorter amendment that 
provided general powers to Congress with specific limitations: 
Louisiana, as ceded by France to the US is made part of the US. Its 
white inhabitants s·hall be citizens, and stand, as to their rights & 
obligations, on the same footing with other citizens of the US in 
analogous situations. Save only that as to the portion thereof lying 
North of an East & West line drawn through of the mouth of the 
Arkansa [sic] river; no new State shall be established; nor any 
grants of land made, other than to Indians in exchange for 
equivalent portions of land occupied by them, until authorized by 
further subsequent amendment to the Constitution shall be made 
268 . for these purposes. · 
Like the earlier amendment, this one reveals Jefferson'~ mistrust of the 
power of the central government. It gives constitutional status to the 
acquisition of the territory itself, thus confirming that Jefferson still believed 
that the federal government did not have the power to acquire territory for 
the United States, much less the power to incorporate new states into the 
Union. It also reveals Jefferson's great concern about large, unincorporated 
territories that the federal government potentially could wield against the 
states. In assessing Jefferson;s proposed amendments, Henry Adams 
remarked that Jefferson seemed unaware "[o]f any jealousy between North 
and South which could be sharpened by such a restriction of northern and 
extension of southern territory."269 B11:t Adams was probably unaware that 
Jefferson received reports from A~torney General Lincoln about the 
unhappiness of New Englanders with the treaty and had, in fact, received a 
265. Id. at 241. 
266. Id. at 248. 
267. See Letter from Navy Secretary Robert Smtih to Thomas Jefferson in BROWN, supra 
note 2, at 39; MALONE, supra note 2, at 315. 
268. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 25, 1803), i.n 8 jEFFERSON 
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 241-45. 
269. 1 ADAMS, jEFFERSON HISTORY, supra note 2, at 358. 
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proposal from Lincoln concerning ways that North-South tensions regarding 
the incorporation of new states could be reduced. 270 
. . 
In proposing and arguing for the constitutional amendments, Jefferson 
explained that he thought it appropriate to seek the approval of "the 
people" or "the nation" before -opening each new stretch of land for 
settlement and eventual statehood.271 Henry Adams made much of this 
language, arguing that Jefferson essentially abandoned his federalism 
principles in favor of centralized .national government. The Constitution; 
Adams wrote, 
in dealing with the matter of amendments, made no reference to·· 
the nation; the word itself was unknown to the Constitution, which 
invariably spoke of the Union wherever such an expression was 
needed; and on the Virginia theory Congress had no right to 
appeal to the nation at all, except as a nation of States, for an 
272 
amendment. 
' Adams's point is well taken, but the fact that Jefferson believed that a 
• • • 
constitutional amendment was necessary showed that Adams misconstrued 
Jefferson's meaning. For one thing, the Founders often spoke of "the 
people" when referring to constitutional amendments because they believed 
tJ:lat a constitutional amendment was a decisive act of the people.273 And 
' Jefferson believed that federalism was the best means of preserving 
republicanism, that securing states' rights secured individual rights.274 In 
seeking a constitutional amendment, Jefferson would have put faith in a 
process that required the legislatures of three-fourths of the existing states to 
approve the incorporation of new territory that had the potential to become 
new states of the Union. 
At the same time, enormous pressures conspired to make upholding 
• 
270. See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text Attorney General Lincoln: who had 
been Jefferson's eyes and ears in New England, wrote to the President on September 10, 1803, 
to report that, as he had predicted, the Federalists were "vexed, disappointed, mortified, 
enraged .... " While he suggested that Jefferson could argue for the constitutionality of the 
treaty, he admitted that a constitutional amendment was the safest option. Letter from Levi 
Lincoln to Thomas Jefferson from Worcester, Mass. (Sept IO; 1803), in MALONE, supra note 2, 
.· 
at 321 n.24. 
'271. 1 ADAMS, jEFFERSON HISTORY;supra note 2, at 359-60. 
272. !d. (emphasis in original). 
273. George Washington. spoke :of constitutional amendments this. way. In his farewell 
address, Washington said, "If in the opinion of the people the distribution or modification of 
the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in 
the way which the Constitution designates." George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 
1796), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 205·, 212 Qames D. 
Richardson ed., 1897). 
274. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to A.C.V.C Destutt de Tracy· Qan. 26, 1811), in 9 
]EFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 309; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gjdeon Granger 
(Aug. 13, 1800), in 7 JEFFERSON WRITINGS~ supra note 4, at 451-52. 
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Jefferson'-s principles difficult. Jefferson felt that, unless Congress acted 
quickly, the opportt1nity to purchase Louisiana would be lost. The treaty of 
cession had arrived on-July 14, 1803, and had to be ratified by October 30.275 
Livingston wrote Jefferson from France warning him that Napoleon could 
change his mind about the deal.276 Jefferson also knew that expressing his 
doubts about the treaty's constitutionality would give his Federalist 
opponents a trump card.277 Thus the strategy emerged to get Congress to 
approve the treaty first, and then use the treaty's doubtful constitutionality 
. . 
to build support for a constitutional amendment. Senator Nicholas 
expressed the view, widely held among Republicans, that if Jefferson 
declared he believed the treaty unco.nstitution~l, the Senate would probably 
reject it. Nicholas suggested that Jefferson "avoid giving an opinion as to the 
competence of the treaty-making power" beca~se "if the Senate act before 
your opinion is known they will at least d~vide responsibility with you."278 So 
neither Jefferson nor any of hi~ allies mentioned the constitutional questions 
when h.€ called Congress in special session to consider the treaty in October 
of 1803.279 In fact,Jefferson urged his friends to avoid mentioning potential 
' 
constitutional difficulties, noting ''that w~at is- necessary for surmounting 
them must be done sub-silentio."280 
In another oft-quoted letter to Breckinridge, Jefferson struggled to 
. . 
reconcile the need to act quickly with his strict construction principle, 
eventually deciding that expediency would require an extra-constituti.onal 
' ' 
act be subsequently made constitutional by amendment: 
. 
The Executive in seizing th_e fugitive occurrence which so much 
advances the good of their country, have done an act beyond the 
Constitution. The Legislature. in casting behind them metaphysical 
subtleties, and risking themselves like faithful servants, must ratify 
& pay for it, and throw themselves on their country for doing for 
them unauthorized what we know they would have done for 
themselves had they been in a situation to do it. It is the case of a 
guardian, investing the money of his ward in purchasing an 
' 
275. MALONE, supra note 2, at 302. 
276. 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 1158 (1803). While there is no reason to doubt that Jefferson 
honestly feared losing such a bargain, the truth is that Napoleon had already made up his mind 
and was unlikely to change it. In fact, Napoleon was in such a weak bargaining position that he 
probably issued the threat to prod jefferson into accepting the deal instead of simply taking the 
territory by force. See MCDONALD, supra note 2, at 71. As for Livingston, his own personal 
interest in the success of the treaty probably motivated him to put pressure on Jefferson to act 
quickly. One historian called his letter to Jefferson self-serving "nonsense., See 4 BRANT, supra 
note 2, at 143. 
277. Malone, supra note 2, at 316. 
278. BROWN, supra note 2, at 27. 
279. MALONE, supra note 2, at316. 
280. Letter from Thomas jefferson to Breckinridge and Thomas Paine (Aug. 18, 1803), in 8 
jEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 245. . 
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important adjacent territory; & saying to him when of age, I did 
this for your own good; I pretend to no right to bind you: you may 
disavow me, and I must get out of the scrape as I can: I thought it 
my duty to risk myself for you. But we shall not be disavowed by the 
nation, and their act of indemnity [ (constitutional amendment)] 
will confirm &_ not weaken the Constitution, by more strongly 
k. . 1. 28t mar tng out Its 1nes. 
This argument, that constitutionality could be conveyed ex post facto, is 
suspect, and marks the beginning of Jefferson's retreat from principle. It 
does reveal the way in which Jefferson believed he could reconcile a strict 
rule with the need for executive flexibility. Most importantly, Jefferson 
believed that the worst result could be avoided that the Louisiana Purchase 
would set a precedent for expanding the power of the national government. 
But this reasoning turned out to be a trap. Nicholas reminded Jefferson 
of the practical consequences that proposing a post-hoc con·stitutional 
amendment would lead Federalists to argue that jefferson had exceeded his 
authority in urging ratification. Even after the Senate passed the treaty and 
the Congress had passed implementing legislation, an amendment passed to 
justify these acts would have diminished the administration's credibility. 
Breckinridge voiced this concern to jefferson: "Ifwe attempt amendments & 
c. "I h II b I d . . · h , · "282 rat , we s a e pace tn a worse sttuauon t an we are now In. 
The Federalist John Quincy Adams, who also believed that a 
constitutional amend-ment was necessary to approve the treaty, was the only 
person in Congress who actually proposed one.283 Mter the treaty was 
approved, Adams told Madison he would introduce a constitutional 
amendment if no one else did. Madison put him off~ replying that "he did 
not know that it was universally agreed that it required an amendment."284 
When Adams went ahead and proposed a committee to draft an amendment 
that would allow for the incorporation of acquired territory into the Union, 
it garnered only three votes.285 While a few Republicans argued that an 
amendment was not necessary, most simply did not engage the question, 
and Breckinridge dismissed the proposal as impractical. 286 Most of the 
momentum for an amendment dissipated once the Senate ratifie~ the 
Louisiana Treaty and the Congress passed the implementing legislation. 
As for Jefferson, his fieryt principled letter to Wilson Cary Nicholas had 
ended with a sunny whimper: "If, 'however, our friends shall think 
281. MALONE, supra note 2~ at 313-14. 
282. PLUMER, supra note 158, at 76-77. 
283. BROWN, supra note 2, at 30-31. 
284. 1 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 267-268 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1877) 
[hereinafter ADAMS MEMOIRS]. 
285. PLUMER, supra note 158, at 78. 
286. MALONE, supra note 2, at 331. 
'. 
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differently, certainly I acquiesce with satisfaction; confiding, that the good 
sense of our country will correct the evil of construction when it shall 
produce ·ill effects."287 Although he still sought advice on the treaty's 
constitutionality after writing the letter to Nicholas, he never did submit an 
amendment.288 Scholars do not agree upon why Jefferson failed to follow 
through with his plans given his grave doubts and firmly expressed 
principles. For example, since Thomas Paine was one of the last to 
correspond with Jefferson on the ~onstitutionality of the treaty, the historian 
Forrest McDonald concludes that Paine persuaded Jefferson to change his 
. d 289 mtn . 
However, it seems far more likely, given the seriousness with which he 
treated the issue in private correspondence and his continuing advocacy of 
states' rights and strict construction after the treaty was approved, that 
Jefferson's own doubts about the constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase 
were never assuaged.290 He never abandoned or compromised his belief that 
federalism was the primary canon of constitutional interpretation. Periodic 
amendment was Jefferson's favored approach to constitutional change, as it 
reinforced the republican principles that Jefferson and his allies had rallied 
to during the lean Federalist years.291 Jefferson knew not only that the treaty 
was an act beyond the Constitution, but that : it was a betrayal of his 
principles concerning the mode .of constitutional interpretation he 
forcefully advocated until the end of his life.292 
Most revealing are Jefferson'~ later attempts, after his presidency, to 
justify his actions that seemed inconsistent with his own principles as 
grounded in the doctrine of necessity. In 1810,Jefferson, while not referring 
specifically to the Louisiana Treaty, could easily have been thinking of it 
287. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in 8 jEFFERSON 
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 248. 
288. Jefferson received letters from Attorney General Lincoln supporting an amendment 
and from Thomas Paine arguing that one was not necessary. 
289. MCDONALD, supra note 11, at 59. Biographer Dumas Malone concludes thatJefferson 
was "caught in a chain of inexorable circumstances" and driven "by the pitiless logic of events" 
to refrain from publicly proposing a constitutional amendment. MALONE, supra note 2, at 319, 
332. Joseph Ellis believes that the West triggered Jefferson's most "visionary energies" which 
"overrode his traditional republican injunctions." ELLIS, supra note 77, at 252. 
290. MAYER, supra note 2, at 251. In particular, Paine's argument that the acquisition of 
Louisiana had been foreseeable by the Framers "probably did not move Jefferson," who viewed 
questions of original intent very strictly. Id. 
291. See id. at 296: 
The generally strict theory of interpretation that Jefferson applied to the federal 
constitution had as its corollary an emphasis upon explicit change through 
amendment, rather than accommodation through interpretation, as the vehicle 
for adding to federal powers, as his proposals with respect to the Louisiana 
Purchase and internal improvements, for example, indicate. 
292. Jefferson protested attempts to authorize internal improvements projects within the 
states as "usurpations" of states' powers. I d. at 220. 
• 
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when he addressed the question of whether high p~blic officers must 
assume authority beyond the law: 
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high 
duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of 
n,ecessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country . . . by a 
scrupulous adherence to the written law, would be to lose the law 
itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying 
them with us; thus absurdly s4crificing the end to the means.293 
If we take this later writing as evidence of jefferson's views at the time of 
the Louisiana Treaty, Jefferson seemed to agree to disagree with his friends 
on the legality of the treaty while at the same time acknowledging the 
necessity of following their advice and trusting in the soundness of public 
opinion, rather than his own principles, for the good of the nation and his 
presidency. As he wrote in his letter to Nicholas during the treaty debates, 
"[w]hat is practicable must often control what is pure theory; and the habits 
of the governed determine in a great degree what is practicable."294 Thus 
Jefferson's exception to the principle of strict construction was justified by 
the same purpose as the principle that the voice of the people needed to 
be heard. 
The irony is that Jefferson probably need not have resorted to this 
constitutional escape clause at alL Although he doubtless felt a great deal of 
pressure to move quickly, Jefferson probably had the freedom to protect 
·. . 
both the constitutional principles he prized and the national interest. There 
is little evidence to suggest that a constitutional amendment would not have 
. . . 
been speedily approved given the widespread popularity of the purchase and 
the Republican dominance in most states. Even the Federalistjohn Quincy 
Adams believed that all of the state legislatures would approve an 
amendment and that, at the very least, "there could be no possible doubt it 
would be ratified by a number sufficient to make it part of the 
Constitution."295 Of course, one can also believe that the treaty was 
technically legal and still assert that a constitutional amendment would have 
been the best way to guarantee widespread acceptance of that legality. As a 
practical matter, Jefferson and his friends' concerns about the risks of 
openly proposing a post-hoc constitutional amendment, if not unfounded, 
were overstated. Indeed, Professor David Currie, who believes the treaty was 
constitutional, points out that the approval of an amendment would have 
removed the question of legitimacy from the table, and would have removed 
293. MALONE, supra note 2, at 320. 
294. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson C. Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in MAYER, supra 
note 2, at 3.20. 
295. DOCUMENTS RElATING TO NEW ENGlAND FEDERALISM 158 (Henry Adams ed.; 
1905) [hereinafter ADAMS, NEW ENGLAND]; see also BROWN, supra note 2, at 29 ("Doubtless such 
an amendment as Jefferson desired could have been carried without great difficulty .... "). 
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doubt as to whether states could be admitted when the time came.296 ln sum, 
Jefferson would have at once eliminated critics' arguments that he was 
usurping power while satisfying his .own concerns about the treaty power 
. 297 being too broad. 
Instead, by abandoning his principles out of purported necessity, 
Jefferson left ·himself vulnerable to legitimate criticism. And many of the 
early assessments of his performance during the Louisiana Purchase were 
withering. One of the harshest critics was John Quincy Adams who, later in 
his life, perhaps still bitter about his failure to muster much support for a 
constitutional amendment, denounced the Louisiana Treaty: 
It mad~ a Union totally different from that for which the 
Constitution had been formed. It give~ despotic power over 
territories purchased. It naturalizes foreign nations in a mass. It 
makes French and Spanish laws a large part of the laws of the 
. 
Union. It introduced whole systems of legislation abhorrent to the 
spirit and character of our instituti<?ns, and all this done by an 
. 
administration which came in blowing a trumpet against implied 
. 298 . power. 
The purchase of Louisiana was, Adams concluded, "an assumption of 
implied power greater in itself and more comprehensive in its consequences 
than all the assumptions of implied powers in the years of the Washington 
and Adams Administrations put together."299 
Henry Adams carried on this family legacy in his History of the United 
States with an almost tragic portrayal of Jefferson as a man surrendering his 
ideal of strict construction for short-term political benefit. "The Pope could 
as safely trifle with the doctrine of apostolic succession as Jefferson with· the 
limits of Executive power," Adams wrote.300 Yet "the Louisiana treaty gave a 
fatal wound to 'strict construction,' and the Jeffersonian theories never 
again r~ceived gener~l support."301 .To Adams, Jefferson had done what he 
himself warned against: made blank paper of the Constitution.302 
Later in the Nineteenth Century, Judge Thomas Cooley assessed 
Jefferson's actions negatively, arguing that the damage had been lasting 
even though the issues it raised had been essentially settled by default. "The 
practical settlement of the question of Constitutional power," he said in a 
speech, · 
did not heal the wound the Constitution received when the chief 
296~ CURRIE, supra note 2, at 107. 
297. See id. 
298. 5 ADAMS MEMOIRS, supra note 284, at 401. 
299. /d. at 364-65. 
300. ADAMS; supra note 153, at 362. 
301. /d. at 363. 
:302. /d. at 364. 
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officer holding office under it advised the temporary putting it 
aside, and secured the approval of his advice by a numerical 
majority of the people. The poison was in the doctrine which took 
from the Constitution all sacredness, and made subject to the will 
and caprice of the hour that which, in the intent of the founders, 
. was above parties, and majorities, and presidents. After that time 
the proposal to exercise unwarranted powers on a plea of necessity 
might be safely advanced without exciting the detestation it 
303 deserved .... 
Henry Cabot Lodge summed it up most succinctly when he wrote that the 
purchase "was the first lesson which taught Americans that a numerical 
majority was superior to the Constitution."304 
More recent assessments have been far more generous. As if to confirm 
Judge Cooley's fears, most contemporary historians seem content to rely 
simply on the judgment that the vast benefits accruing to the nation from 
the Louisiana Purchase were more than worth the costs to constitutional 
. . 1 305 prtnctp es. 
But in the end, the greatest harm with regard to the Louisiana Purchase 
was not in the changes it made to the geographical character of the Union; 
although these changes were certainly important, they were probably 
inevitable. Rather, the lasting damage would come from the wrong choice of 
means for constitutional change. Jefferson biographer Joseph Ellis calls the 
decision to avoid an amendment "unqu,estionably correct'' because the 
resulting debate "would have raised a constellation of nettlesome 
questions about slavery and the slave trade, Indian lands, Spanish land 
claims and a host of other jurisdictional issues that might have put the 
entire purchase at risk."306 But the amendment process was the means by 
which Jefferson believed the most difficult questions facing the nation 
should be worked out. As David Mayer noted, Jefferson believed strongly in 
' 
the "principle that constitutional problems ought to be resolved not through 
ingenious construction wheth,er as an exercise of executive prerogative, as 
• 
303. LODGE, supra note 164, ~t 333-34. 
304. Jd. at 434-35. Similarly, the eminent historian Frederick Jackson Turner later 
concluded that the Louisiana Purchase ''resulted in strengthening the loose interpretation of 
the Constitution.'• Frederick J. Turner, The Significance of the Louisiana Purchase, 27 AM. 
MONTHLY REV. OF REVS. 578, 583 (1903). 
305. See e.g., ELLIS, supra note 77, at 211. Some contemporary historians, in judging 
Jefferson's actions with regard to the Louisiana Purchase, have concluded that he could not 
have done otherwise. Jefferson biographer Dumas Malone ack11owledged that the Louisiana 
treaty changed the character of the Union. MALONE, supra note 2, at 326. Nonetheless, he 
believed Jefferson was "caught in a chain of inexorable circumstances," id. at 332, and driven 
"by the pitiless logic of events," i,d. at 319, to refrain from publicly proposing a constitutional 
amendment. To Malone, Jefferson's suppression of his principles demonstrated his skills as a 
leader that he "was a good party man, that he did take counsel." ld. at 319. 
306. ELLIS, supra note 77, at 211. 
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in the Louisiana Purchase, or as an exercise of judicial interpretation ... -
but rather through appeals to the people.-"307 As I discuss in the next Part, an 
appeal to "the people" through a constitutional amendment was especially 
important given the eventual consequences of the treaty those that had 
been ·anticipated by the Federalists the disruption of the balance of power 
between regions and the addition of numerous slave states in the South and 
West. 
V. THE LEGACY OF THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE 
In this Part, I consider the consequences of the failure to ratify the 
Louisiana Treaty with a constitutional amendment. Inevitably, this involves a 
great deal of speculation.308 However, what is striking about subsequent 
developments is the degree to which the debate between the Jeffersonians' 
empire of liberty federalism and the Federalists' balance of forces federalism 
never really ended. As I discuss in the first subpart, this conflict merely faded 
into the background while Congress addressed the regulation of slavery in 
the Louisiana Territory. When the two theories of federalism re-emerged, 
they became inextricably intertwined with the issue of slavery: balance of forces 
with the regulation of slavery by the national government; the empire of liberty 
with the right of states to permit slavery. This demonstrates that the most 
important issues raised by the Louisiana Treaty itself were not satisfactorily 
resolved until the Civil War~ I argue that a constitutional amendment could 
well have resolved this conflict, and possibly also resolved the question of 
whether Congress could regulate slavery in the territory the burning issue 
in the decades leading up to secession~ Yet because the empire of liberty 
federalism finally triumphed in the Dredd Scott decision resulting in the 
triumph of slavery in the West federalism itself was suspect. 
In the second subpart, I discuss a related consequence of the failure to 
seek an amendment: it paved the way for further re-interpretations of the 
Constitution outside the Article Five amendment process. The Louisiana 
Purchase set a precedent for expansion of federal power, and the 
corresponding reduction of states, rights, through federal actions that failed 
to give the states a voice in constitutional change. 
A. THE REGULATION OF SLA VE"'RY IN THE TERRITORIES 
Once the treaty was ratified and implemented, Congress was left to 
decide how to go about preparing the citizens of the territory for statehood. 
In some respects, the Louisiana Territory was treated differently than other 
existing territories,. in part because its inhabitants were largely non-English. 
Even so, the southern portion proceeded to join the Union by 1812.309 But 
307. MAYER, supra note 2, at 313. 
308. I proceed fully aware of the danger of engaging in counter-factual hypotheticals. 
309. Onuf, Expanding Union, supra note 18, at 64. 
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the crucial question was whether slavery would be permitted in this vast new 
area of the United States. The Republicans' success at incorporating the 
Louisiana Territory brought slavery to the forefront of the issues causing 
tension among the states. The Federalists would eventually associate 
slavery rightly, perhaps with their loss of .influence in the national 
government. Jefferson's failure to request a constitutional amendment was a 
lost opportunity to seek approval from all of the states for changes that 
would one day drive them to separation. 
The Northwest Ordinance promised statehood to each territorial unit 
upon reaching a population of sixty thousand.310 The same promise was 
extended to the Mississippi Territory encompassing what is now Mississippi 
and Alabama with one important difference slavery was permitted.311 In 
contrast to these earlier compacts with territories, the Louisiana treaty 
merely promised incorporation and the admission of the inhabitants "to the 
rights" of U.S. citizens. Jefferson's original plan for Louisiana, as his very 
detailed first proposed amendment indicates, involved the annexation of 
New Orleans, and the settled territory surrounding it, to the existing 
Mississippi Territory and ''locking up" the rest from white settlement.3 12 
Thus this small area of the Louisiana Territory would have proceeded to 
statehood in a manner similar to the states governed by the Northwest 
Ordinance. 
However, once the treaty and implementing legislation were approved, 
Jefferson changed his mind. He wrote in a letter to Gallatin that, " [ w] ithout 
looking at the old territorial ordinance [Northwest Ordinance] I had 
imagined it best to found a government for the territory or territories of 
lower Louisiana on that basis. But on examining it, I find it will not do at all; 
that it would turn all their laws topsy-turvy." Instead, Jefferson decided the 
best arrangement was for him to appoint a governor and three judges with 
full legislative powers who would introduce the rights of American 
citizenship trial by jury in criminal cases, habeas corpus, freedom of the 
press "by degrees as they find practicable without exciting too much 
discontent."313 Historian Everett Brown pointed out the irony of this plan: 
'jefferson, who had drawn up the Declaration of Independence, is here 
found planning a form of government in which the people to be governed 
were to have no voice whatever. "314 Despite these limitations, Louisiana 
310. /d. at 70. For analysis of the Ordinance, see supra notes 141-49 and accompanying 
text. 
311. /d. at 64. 
312. Letter from Thomas jefferson to Horatio Gates Uuly 11, 1803), in 8 jEFFERSON 
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 249-50; supra notes 256--74 and accompanying text (discussing 
Jefferson's proposed constitutional amendments). 
313. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (Nov. 9, 1803), in 8 JEFFERSON 
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 275. 
314. BROWN, supra note 2, at 97. 
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proceeded quickly along the path to statehood, joining the Union in 1812, 
earlier than Mississippi (1817) or Alabama (1818) .315 
The most significant question remaining to be resolved was that of 
slavery. The Northwest Ordinance, unlike the Mississippi Territory's 
compact, contained an absolute prohibition on slavery. Even delegates from 
states with large slave populations voted for the provision in 1786 because 
they knew that western states would share their interests anyway, and their 
real concern was with preserving economic ties to the West.316 Nor had 
slavery been the most important worry for the Federalists. As late as 1815, 
Federalist leaders, such as Timothy Pickering, were more concerned that the 
West would seek to dominate by forming a temporary alliance with the 
South, then overthrowing the entire eastern seaboard. Thus some New 
Englanders on occasion still contemplated an alliance between North and 
317 South against West. 
Inevitably, however, the Three-Fifths Clause tied the dominance of the 
southern and western states in the Congress, and thus the dominance of 
Republicans, to the existence of slavery. Many sons of Federalist fathers 
assumed leading roles in the rise of abolitionism in New England after 1815, 
and they considered the fight against slavery and the South as the true 
heritage of Federalism. By the 1830s, abolitionist historians saw the 1800 
election, and the Louisiana Purchase, as victories "of forces scheming to 
extend slave territory and Southern power.''318 
Still, when Congress debated and approved the government bill for 
Louisiana in 1804, the country was not yet geographically stratified on th-e 
issue of slavery. 319 At least some Senators and Representatives- did not yet 
feel that slavery, or the opposition to it, was inextricably bound up with their 
states' interests. Not all southern Senators supported allowing slavery in 
Louisiana; some felt that it would be too difficult to prevent a slave 
insurrection in the wilderness province, and Senators Franklin of North 
Carolina and Breckinridge of Kentucky declared themselves opposed to 
permitting any slavery to exist.32° Conversely, Senator Dayton of New Jersey 
supported allowing slavery, believing that the province would never be 
settled without it, and that the treaty had committed the United States to 
respecting the right of Louisiana's inhabitants to own slaves. 321 
However, the issue dominated discussion of the government bill, and a 
fault line began to develop that would one day become an unbridgeable 
chasm. After efforts by Federalists to prohibit slavery in Louisiana failed, a 
315. Onuf, Expanding Union, supra note 18, at 64. 
316. ONUF, supra note 133, at 111. 
317. BANNER, supra note 16, at 111-12. 
318. I d. at 1 09. 
319. BROWN, supra note 2, at 108. 
320. /d. at 108,119-20. 
321. !d. at 113-14. 
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bill was introduced allowing only U.S. citizens residing in a state who were 
bona fide owners of slaves to bring them into the Louisiana Territory for the 
purposes of settlement. The importation of slaves from abroad was 
prohibited, and any slave imported since May 1, 1798, was excluded from 
·the territory.322 The debate in the Senate was confused and bitter, but the 
bill passed. "I think it unfortunate,'' said Senator White of Delaware, "that 
whenever this question is stirred, feelings are excited that [are] calculated to 
1 d ,323 ea us astray. 
The result demonstrated the growing power of slavery as a vital interest 
for southern states and their increasing dominance in national politics. In 
the end, it was only the divisions among Republicans that allowed the 
I. . . 1 h h. d 324 Th L . . b h Imitations on s avery t at were ac teve . . us outstana ecame muc 
more like the Mississippi Territory in terms of slavery than the territory 
governed by the Northwest Ordinance. The existence of slavery in 
Louisiana, once established, would be difficult to eliminate, and the 
geographical area in which it could now potentially spread was vast. 
The success of the Louisiana Purchase, and the inability of its 
opponents to limit the inevitable introduction of new Republican states, 
embittered the New England Federalists. Inclined toward paranoia, they saw 
the declining influence of their region and party as the workings of a 
malevolent political force.325 They felt that the Louisiana Purchase 
represented the defeat of the view of the Constitution as a compact among 
states and a victory for the power of the national government. "Instead of 
free republicks united by solemn compact, under a federal government with 
limited powers," expressed the Massachusetts Federalists, "we have become a 
consolidated empire under the absolute controul of a few men we have 
sunk into the deep abyss of a frightful despotism."326 An anonymous 
pamphleteer in 1804 proclaimed that "[w]e are parties in name to a 
confederacy over which we have no influence, nor control, nor effective 
voice in the national councils, and the wishes and the policy of New England 
are only known as they furnish themes for the invective and irony of those 
h 1 h . ,327 w o rue t . e nation. 
Increasingly, the Federalists came to believe that slavery, rather than the 
Constitution, was to blarne.328 Convinced that the dominance ofVirginia and 
the South, and the Louisiana Purchase itself, had been the result of the 
operation of the Three-Fifths Clause, the Federalists after 1804 began 
322. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 1297 (1803). 
323. PLUMER, supra note 158, at 115. 
324. MCDONALD, supra note 11, at 61. 
325. BANNER, supra note 16, at 40. 
326. ld. at 40-41. 
327. A DEFENCE OF THE LEGISLATURE OF MAsSACHUSETTS, OR THE RIGHTS OF NEWENQLAND 
VINDICATED 4 (Boston, 1804), quoted in BANNER, supra note 16, at86. 
328. BANNER, supra note 16, at 103. 
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actively to seek its repeal. ''[T]he slave representation,'' said Josiah Quincy, 
"is the cause of all the difficulties we labor under."329 
So great was the disillusionment that talk of secession began to be taken 
seriously. William Plumer said that the eastern states would be forced "to 
establish a separate and independent empire."330 ln January of 1804, as 
Congress was to debate the Louisiana government bill, Timothy Pickering 
convened a group in Washington to come up with a plan of secession.331 
Their plot to elect Aaron Burr as a secessionist governor of New York was 
thwarted by other Federalists, and other subsequent schemes were equally 
stillborn.332 However, after a series of foreign policy blunders led to the War 
of 1812, the secessionist movement gained new life, and the Massachusetts 
legislature called for other New England states to convene in Hartford, 
C . £ . th d . 333 onnecttcut, or a convention _ at most e-xpecte to propose secesston. 
Moderates prevailed at the Convention, however, and it merely proposed 
seven constitutional amendments designed to ad.dress New Englanders' 
concerns. The first proposed amendment sought to eliminate the Three-
Fifths Clause.334 Another would have required a two-thirds majority vote in 
.each house of Congress before a state could be admitted to the Union.335 
The arguments raised by the Federalists during the Louisiana Treaty 
debate, and the balance of forces view of the Constitution they implied, kept 
.· 
returning even after most believed they had been discredited. When 
Louisiana, which comprised the southern, and most settled, tip of the huge 
territory, applied for statehood in 1811, the Federalists had not given up, 
and they repeated their warnings about the dangers to the balance of the 
Union. "Instead of these new States being annexed to us," Representative 
Laban "Wheaton of Massachusetts warned; ''we shall be annexed to them, 
lose our in-dependence, and become altogether subject to their control. "336 
Josiah Quincy delivered a long, impassioned speech in which he insisted that 
"[t]he ·proportion of the political weight of each sovereign State depends 
upon the number of States which have a voice under th.e compact." If 
Congress should "throw the weight ofLouisiana onto the scale," the balance 
that the original states sought to sustain would be "destroyed."337 The 
solution, proposed repeatedly by the Federalists, and always defeated, was a 
. . I d 33s constttuttona amen ment. 
329 .. 
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Historian Peter Onuf argues that the Federalists' balance offorces vision 
of the Constitution was already obsolete when Quincy expressed it in the 
House debate. It relied, Onuf believes, on an outmoded European concept 
that simply did not apply to a peacefully-expanding union. 339 At the same 
time, however, Onuf seems to be aware that a great deal had been lost in 
abandoning the balance of forces view. The Republicans' empire of liberty theory 
held that the Union could expand indefinitely so long as each new state was 
admitted on an equal footing with the old.340 Yet, Onuf points out, "Quincy's 
' 
speech would prove prophetic, for union depended on sustaining an 
intersectional balance and accommodating the fundamentally conflicting 
interests that his use of the language of state sovereignty so obviously 
assumed/'341 Keeping the union together would depend on awareness of the 
Federalists' balance of forces vision of the Constitution, which the Louisiana 
treaty implicitly rejected. 
Onuf was not quite right when he declared the balance of forces dead. 
Like Banquo's Ghost, it kept returning to the dinner table to frighten the 
342 . . . . 
empire of liberty.~ Its most devastating appearance was on February 13, 1819, 
when the U.S. House of Representatives "resolved itself into a Committee of 
. . 
the Whole to consider statehood enabling bills for the territories of Missouri 
and A1abama."343 Not only did the sectional balance of power hinge on the 
status of Missouri, but these two territories would set a precedent for the rest 
of the states admitted from the Louisiana Territory. 344 In a provocative move 
that summoned the balance of forces from its grave, James Tallmadge 
introduced an amendment to ban the admission of slaves into Missouri or 
h f h . ~5 any ot er part o t e terrttory. 
During this debate, the Federalists advanced the same arguments from 
a balance of forces theory of states' rights that they had used during the 
Louisiana Treaty debate. The original compron1ises in the Constitution 
regarding slavery, the Federalists argued, were the result of a balance struck 
among the thirteen original states. Rufus King, who had also been present 
during debates on the Louisiana Treaty, said that "the considerations arising 
out of their actual condition, their past connexion, and the obligation which 
all felt to promote a reformation in the federal government, ·were particular 
to the time and parties.''346 To extend those balances beyond the original 
limits of the United States would not be faithful to the original compact. As 
a practical matter; the incorporation of new slave states in the West would 
339. Onuf, The Expanding Union, supra note 18, ~t 79. 
340. ld. 
341. ld. 
342. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act III, sc. 4. 
343. MICHAEL A. MORRISON, SLAVERY AND THE AMERICAN WEST 45 ( 1 997). 
344. !d. at 45-48. 
345. I d. at 45. 
346. !d. at 46-47. 
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result in a huge increase of the area in which the Three-Fifths Compromise 
operated. Thus the northern states, losing relative representation in 
Congress, would be helpless to enforce the terms of the original bargain. So, 
they concluded, the federal government had the power to regulate slavery in 
order to preserve the interests of the original states.347 
The Southern Republicans responded with Jefferson's empire of liberty 
federalism. No state could be forced to enter the Union according to 
conditions. All states were born equal. Missouri, they argued, had the right 
to enter the Union on an equal footing, without restrictions. This time, 
however, the balance of forces argument enjoyed a temporary revival. Congress 
enacted the Missouri Compromise, in which Missouri was admitted as a slave 
state, Maine as a free state, and which led to the drawing of the 36°30' North 
latitude line, north of which slavery would be excluded and south of which it 
would be authorized.348 This action pushed the debate into the background 
temporarily. Yet the empire of liberty again emerged with Stephen Douglas's 
idea of popular sovereignty, implemented by the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 
1854, which abandoned the geographical line in favor of elections to 
determine a new states' slave or free status.349 The empire of liberty view of the 
Constitution was ultimately endorsed by the Supreme Court in the infamous 
Dred Scott decision, in which the Missouri Compromise was struck down as 
. . I 35o unconstttuttona . 
Jefferson, sick at home in Monticello, called the Missouri Crisis a "fire 
bell in the night" that woke him from his satisfied retirement because it 
threatened to undo the work of his entire political career.351 He condemned 
the restrictionist efforts, unable to accept that an artificial line would divide 
the "Empire of Liberty" he had sought to build.352 As Peter Onuf concluded, 
Jefferson's ambitions were the victim of the empire of liberty theory that he had 
long advocated.353 Jefferson wanted the United States to become a large 
nation of many equal states, each exercising broad powers in its own 
domain, yet with its interests in harmony with the others. So long as state 
equality was recognized, Jefferson hoped that "relations of blood and 
affection" would overcome considerations of geography.354 Yet Jefferson had 
a blind spot for slavery; he simply refused to address it, declaring it a matter 
347. /d. 
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for the next generation to resolve.355 He could not accept the fact that 
slavery had become a powerful sectional interest that transcended state 
boundaries while dividing the nation in two. Such were the consequences of 
his having earlier ignored the balance ojforces view. 
These debates over slavery, the Constitution, and· , the nature of the 
union, would have occurred even if jefferson had followed through with his 
plan to ratify the Louisiana Treaty with a constitutional amendment. Yet 
Jefferson's original instincts were correct: only by returning to the People 
for permission to expand, and perhaps resolving the issue of slavery in the 
territories while it was not yet the issue that would reflexively fracture the 
nation along sectional lines, could the nation have hoped to avoid the 
battles that paralyzed Congress in the years leading up to the Civil War. 356 
B. THE DECUNE OF THE ARTICLE FivE METHOD OF CHANGING THE CONSTITUTION 
This subpart examines the long-term consequences of the Louisiana 
. . 
Purchase on the method by which the Constitution could be altered~ Under 
a balance of forces view of federalism, the Article Five constitutional 
amendment process is crucial, because it secures a role for the existing states 
whenever there is a proposed alteration in the fundamental relationship 
between the states and the national government. But by ratifying the 
Louisiana Treaty without seeking an amendment, Jefferson and the 
Congress reinterpreted the Constitution. The act of approving and 
implemen~ing the treaty effectively established that it was constitutional for 
the federal government to incorporate new states into the Union through 
the treaty power. The failure of Jefferson and Congress to affirm the 
constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase with an amendment seriously 
diminished the role that Article Five, and the states themselves, would play 
in future constitutional change. 
Article Five is the only text-based method for amending the 
Constitution. An amendment approved by two-thirds of both houses of 
Congress must be ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states to 
take effect. 357 Alternatively, if two-thirds of the state legislatures petition 
Congress, it must call a constitutional convention for prop,osing 
amendments, which take effect when approved either by three-fourths of the 
state legislatures or, if Congress directs, by conventions in three-fourths of 
th t t . 358 -e s a es. 
355. jOSEPH]. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS 239-40 (First Vintage 2000). 
356. See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995, at 147 (1996). Ryvig explains that when the secession finally came, 
Congress finally considered constitutional amendments that might resolve the crisis "because 
bitter experience had demonstrated that compromise arrangements expressed in legislative 
enactments could easily be upset by further legislation such as the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 
or judicial decisions such as Dred Scott v. Sanjw.d." /d. 
357. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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A wave of recent scholarship; led by Professor Bruce Ackerman, 
co-ncludes that most fundamental constitutional change has taken place 
outside Article Five. 359 According to Professor Ackerman, American 
democracy operates on two levels, with long periods of ordinary lawmaking 
interrupted by "higher lawmaking," or "constitutional moments," in which 
one or more of the political branches create a new constitutional regime 
with the overwhelming support of the People~360 There have been three such 
transitions in American history, initiated by the writing of the Constitution, 
the Civil War, and the New Deal.361· Each of these constitutional moments 
proceeded through a discrete series of stages. First, in a "signaling stage,'; 
the reformers moved to the center stage of public attention. Next, during a 
"proposal stage," a series of reforms was articulated. Then followed a 
"mobilized popular deliberation" and finally, legal codification. 362 Ackerman 
believes it is particularly significant that each of these major changes 
occurred without the normal Article Five procedure. 363 
Other scholars have built on Ackerman's thesis and expanded the 
definition of constitutional change to include le'ss obviously dramatic shifts 
in the law. Professor James Pope focused on "republican moments," or 
"periodic outbursts of democratic participation and ideological politics," in 
which social movements overcome interest group politics in order to 
359. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE 
THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998);, see jOHN R. VILE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 76-80 (1994) (describing various methods of constitutional change, including 
court decisions and acts of political branches); Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism in the _Un_ited 
States: From Theary. to Politics, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 37, 39 (Sanford Levinson ed., 
1995) (defining the Constitution as "text~based institutional practice,). But seeKYVIG, supra note 
356, at xi (arguing that constitutional amendments are qualitatively unique constitutional acts). 
Akhil Reed Amar believes that Article Five is not the only constitutionally-sanctioned 
method for amending the Constitution. Akhil Reed Atnar, Consent of the Governed: Constitutional 
Amendment Outside Article V:. 94 COLUM. L. REv. 457, 459-60 (arguing that Article Five merely 
enumerates the ways that government actors may initiate constitutional reform, but that the 
People may initiate it on their own). For a contrasting view, see David R. Dow, The Plain 
Meaning of Article Five, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra, at 117 (criticizing Amar and 
Ackerman's theories and insisting on Article Five as the exclusive means of amending the 
Constitution). 
360. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 359, at 6. One criticism of Ackerman's view is that it can be 
used by its proponents to pick and choose moments that support their arguments. Bradley, 
supra note 21, at 124 n.l56., For this and other criticisms, see RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING 
LAW 215-28 (1995); Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of 
Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REv. 759 (1992); Laurence H. 
Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 108 HARv. L~ REv. 1221 (1995). 
361. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 359, at 40. 
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produce changes by working outside formal democratic procedures.364 In 
addition to the Civil War and the New Deal, republican moments include 
the Jeffersonian upsurge, the Age of Jackson, the Populist Era, and the 
1960s.365 While also minimizing the role of the formal amendment process, 
Professor Robert Lipkin took a slightly different approach, insisting that the 
judiciary, rather than the people, is the true - engine of constitutional 
revolution. 366 Lipkin articulates a theory of constitutional change patterned 
on Thomas Kuhn's formulation of scientific revolutions. 367 Periods of 
. 
"normal adjudication" are interrupted by "revolutionary adjudication," in 
which judges appeal to factors extrinsic to the Constitution in order to solve 
a pressing moral or political problem.368 Finally, in a recent article, Professor 
David A. Strauss dispensed with the significance of Article Five altogether, 
arguing that constitutional amendments are simply irrelevant.369 According 
to Strauss, not only does constitutional change occur without amendments, 
but the amendments themselves are superfluous because they either ratify 
an already existing constitutional order or they are simply ignored, as the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ignored in the South for nearly a century.370 
In many ways, the Republican ascendancy in 1800 the beginning of 
what Professor Pope calls the 'Jeffersonian upsurge" resembles the 
contexts of other significant episodes of constitutional change. Realigning 
elections often herald shifts in constitutional under.standings.371 Jefferson 
was swept into office on_ a popular tidal wave that nearly drowned the 
Federalists.372 And once in office, Jefferson "was a stronger president than 
either of his predecessors tried to be."373 According to biographer Dumas 
Malone, Jefferson's influence in Congress remained unmatched until the 
Wilson administration, and Congress passed "virtually no bills of any 
. . fi " . h h. I 374 s1gn1 1cance Wit out IS approva . 
On the other hand, the Louisiana Purchase does not fit neatly into the 
theories of constitutional change articulated by Ackerman or Pope because 
there was no inter-branch conflict requiring the President and Congress to 
364. ja1nes Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Pr1Jular Power in the American 
Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 287, 292-93 (1990). 
365. /d. at 312. 
366. Robert Justin Lipkin, The Anatomy of Constitutional Revolutions, 68 NEB. L. REV. 701, 
701-02 (1989). 
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1458-59 (200 1). 
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work outside of the system through a call for support from the People.375 
Instead, the Purchase was made p.ossible by a triumph of the system. Because 
the Supreme Court had not yet decided Marbury v. Madison and asserted its 
. . f th c . . 376 • th ll h prerogative as Interpreter o e onstttutton, VIctory at e po s t e 
Jeffersonian Republicans' overwhelming triumph in the 1800 elections-
supplied all of the authority Jefferson needed to negotiate and ratify the 
Louisiana treaty. 
Nonetheless, the Louisiana treaty certainly wrought fun.damental 
constitutional change as defined by Professor Strauss: it affected "matters at 
the core of what the written Constitution addresses," including "'the 
allocation of power between the federal government and the states."377 The 
• 
treaty affirmatively resolved the question of whether the treaty power 
enabled the President and the Senate to bring vast new territory into the 
United States and incorporate it into the Union as new states. Their 
influence in the national government diluted, the original states, particularly 
the northeastern ones, would never be the same. Moreover, once Jefferson 
dropped his plans to declare most of the Louisiana Territory off limits to 
setdement, the federal government now directly ruled a territory as vast as 
that of the original thirteen states. 
That jefferson and the Republicans authored this constitutional change 
without relying on the amendment process is striking considering that they 
had been the Article Five faithful. The adoption of the first ten amendments 
relieved Republicans' anxieties about an. overreaching federal government 
and offered proof that a workable system for constitutional reform existed. 378 
Many Federalists ·shared this view. In his ·farewell address, George 
Washington spoke of Article Five as preserving the sovereignty of the people: 
"If in the opinion of the people the distribution or modification of the 
constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an 
d . h h. h h c . . d . "379 amen ment tn t e way w IC · t e onstttut1on es1gnates. 
Also of particular importance to Republicans was Article· Five's 
preservation of the balance between state and federal power~ Madison 
argued in Federalist 39 that Article Five, in 
requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the 
proportion by States, not by citizens, it departs from the national and 
advances towards the federal c·haracter; in rendering th-e 
375. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 359, at 10-12; Pope, supra note 364, at 291-92. 
376. Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 177, 177-78 (1803) ("It is, emphatically, the 
province and duty ·of the judicial department, to say what the law is. . . . So, if a law be. in 
opposition to the constitution; ... the court must determine which of these conflicting rules 
governs the case .... "). 
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concurrence of less than the whole number of states sufficient, it 
loses again the federal and partakes of the national character. 380 
• 
The Article Five amendment process was, as Professor Ackerman 
observed, a "state-centered medium," which ensured that a "national 
consensus, no matter how broad or ·deep, would not generate higher law 
unless the states, acting as states, gave their free and overwhelming 
assent."381 The Eleventh Amendment, which directly overruled a decision of 
the Supreme Cou·rt permitting states to be sued in federal court, seemed to 
confirm for the Republicans that the constitutional amendment was an 
important means of checking federal power and bolstering states' rights. 382 
The Republicans' victory in 1800 was, Jefferson wrote, "as real a 
revolution in the principles of our government as that of 1776 was in its 
form."383 Many rank and file Republicans believed their victory would initiate 
a new round of constitutional reform in which the Article Five amendment 
process would be used to limit federal power.384 Indeed, when Federalists 
sought to deny Jefferson the presidency after the 1800 election resulted in 
an electoral college tie between him and Aaron Burr, Jefferson threatened 
to use the Republican majorities in the state legislatures to call for a 
constitutional convention.385 As Jefferson recounted to James Monroe, this 
threat was effective: 
[T]hey were completely alarmed at the resource for which we 
declared, to wit, a convention to re-organize the government, & to 
• 
amend it The word convention gives them the horrors, as in the 
present democratical spirit of America, they fear they should lose 
f h . c. ·• 1 f h c . . 386 some o t e1r tavortte morse so t e onstitutton. 
In October 1801, just before the new Republican Congress began its 
first session_, Edmund Pendleton published "The Danger Not Over," a 
widely-read list of policies that he thought should be implemented to 
complete the 1800 . revolution.387 It called for several new constitutional 
amendments to limit federal power, including one requiring a single-term 
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381. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 359, at 121. 
382. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The amendment's immediate effect was to overrule Chisholm 
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (holding that the Constitution authorized the federal 
courts to hear suits between a state and the citizen of another state or a foreign country). 
383. Letter from Thomasjefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 10 JEFFERSON 
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 140. 
384. BANNING, supra note 78, at 281-82. 
. . 
385. JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 69-70 (1992). 
386. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Feb. 15, 1801), in 7 JEFFERSON 
• 
WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 490, 491. 
387. BANNING, supra note 78, at 281-82. 
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presidency, shorter terms for U.S. Senators, and that both houses of 
Congress, through simple majorities, approve treaties.388 
However, despite possessing strong majorities in Congress and in most 
state legislatures, the Republicans managed to · ratify only one amendment 
during the Jefferson administration . the Twelftl) which was designed to 
ensure that the electoral college snafu that tied up the presidential election 
of 1800 would not be repeated in 1804.389 Of course, it is not surprising that 
Jefferson would ignore the amendments proposed by the more radical 
Republicans, for such changes would have crippled the national government 
their party now controlled. But it is more puzzling why the Republicans 
would fail to seek amendments to approve obvious expansions of federal 
power beyond the limits set by a strict textual interpretation of the 
Constitution. The most prominent of these expansions of federal power, the 
Louisiana Purchase, set a bad precedent for supporters of states' rights and 
limited federal power. 
Indeed, the failure to seek an amendment for approving the Louisiana 
Treaty triggered Article's V's fall into disuse. After the ratification of the 
Twelfth Amendment in 1804, not a single amendment was ratified until the 
Thirteenth Amendment in 1865 the longest period in the Constitution's 
history in which it was not amended. Nor was the amendment process 
seriously considered as a means of resolving the most important issues of the 
day. Not until the thirty-sixth Congress in 1860 far too late were 
amendments offered concerning Congressional power over slavery in the 
territories, a question which had bedeviled Congress at least since 1820, and 
which ·eventually helped to provoke secession.390 While one proposed 
amendment did come very close to ratification, coming up just one state 
short, its significance would hardly have been earth-shattering. It would have 
extended to all citizens, Article I, section 9' s ban on grants of "Emolument, 
Office, or Title ... from any King, Prince, or Foreign State."391 In contrast, 
proposed amendments that would have resolved disturbing ambiguities 
concerning the relative power of the state and federal governments went 
nowhere. Even strenuous efforts by Jefferson and Madison, when both were 
out of office, failed to move Congress to propose amendments ratifying 
expansions of federal power such as the authority to build internal 
388. Edmund Pendleton, The Danger Not Ooer, RICHMOND EXAMINER, Oct. 20, 1801, quoted 
in BANNING, supra note 78, at 282. 
389. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
390. See Herman V. Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States during the First Century of its History, in 2 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERJCAN 
HISTORICAL AsSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1896, at 201-02 (1897) . Several amendments were 
proposed in Congress only after Lincoln's election, and once states had already begun to 
secede. A Peace Conference led by former President john Tyler proposed amendments, which 
were defeated in Congress. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 348, at 82-93. 
391. SeeKYVIG, supra note 356, at 117; U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 6. 
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improvements.392 Having failed to push for constitutional amendments 
during their respective presidencies, both Jefferson and Madison deserve 
blame for the neglect of the Article Five process which both had praised as 
the most important means of effecting constitutional change. 
As historians point out, however, the· Supreme Court also played an 
important role in the neglect of Article Five. The same year the Louisiana 
Treaty was signed, the Supreme Court decided Marbury v. Madison, which 
declared unconstitutional a provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789.393 Later, 
in McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court took an expansive view of the federal 
government's right to take actions "necessary and. proper" to carry out 
textually-granted powers.394 Professor David E. Kyvig argued that "these 
steps .. ~ eroded the sense of amendment as the necessary solution to every 
uncertainty about governmental authority."395 However, while judicial review 
may have removed the need to call for a constitutional amendment each 
time disputes about the meaning of the text arose, the Court was not well-
positioned to resolve fundamental disagreements about the scope of federal 
and state power, or to protect the interests of the states. Indeed, the Court 
did not strike down another exercise of federal power for another half 
century, until Dredd Scott v. Sanford in 1857.396 Here, the Court's effort to 
resolve a profound constitutional crisis over slavery in the territories, which 
had paralyzed the political branches, failed spectacularly. 397 Only during the 
"Secession Winter" of 1860-61, after Abraham Lincoln had been elected 
President and seven states had seceded from the Union, did Congress 
seriously consider constitutional amendments to address the conflict over 
398 
slavery. 
The failure to approve a constitutional amendment authorizing the 
Louisiana Treaty weakened states' rights in two significant ways. First, it 
confirmed that the federal government could fundamentally and 
permanently alter the domestic relations among the states through the 
treaty power. Second, it set a precedent for bypassing the Article Five 
method of constitutional change, which gave the states a role equal to that 
of Congress. The Louisiana Purchase thus laid the groundwork for two 
subsequent significant expansions of federal power outside of the formal 
amendment process Reconstruction and the New Deal. 
While the Reconstruction Amendments the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, 
392. MAYER, supra note 2, at 313. 
393. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 177, 177-78 (1803). 
394.. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
395. KWIC, supra note 356, at 111. 
396. See Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
397. The Court's decision created a firestorm of protest from antislavery forces and 
"damaged for over a generation the Court's authority as an interpreter of the Constitution.'' 
BERNSTEIN, supra note 348, a.t 80. 
398. BERNSTEIN, supra note 348, at 82-93. 
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and Fifteenth marked a return to the formal method of constitutional 
chan.ge, their ratification is mired in controversy. As Professor Strauss put it, 
"The states of the Confederacy did not so much ratify the amendments as 
submit to them because they were the defeated parties and had little 
choice."399 The First Reconstruction Act blocked the readmission into the 
Union of any of the Southern states until enough states ratified the 
Fourteenth Amendment to make it part of the Constitution.400 Subsequent 
Reconstruction Acts passed in the spring and summer of 1867 divided the 
South ''into five military districts and placed the Union Army in control of 
any further transition to statehood. Commanding generals were authorized 
to call new constitutional 'conventions'~' after compiling voting registers that 
enfranchised blacks and disenfranchised disloyal whites.401 Thus Professor 
Ackerman calls the Reconstruction Amendments "amendments-simulcra" 
because their ratification "made a hash" of the Article Five method: 
Congress possessed an effective override of the states' right to veto the 
amendments, telling Republican governments that a decision to reject 
"deprived them of all political power in the councils of the nation."402 
According to Ackerman, the Reconstruction Amendments marked a shift 
from the Framers' constitutional regime . expressed by the Article Five 
treatment of the states and the federal government as co-equal partners in 
constitutional change to a new regime in which the federal government 
dominates constitutional change.403 While some scholars, such as Professor 
John Harrison, have argued that the Reconstruction Amendments were 
lawful, even Harrison admits that Article Five failed to adequately serve its 
purpose of balancing principles of federalism and nationalism. 404 
During the New Deal, another constitutional change that vastly 
expanded federal power,. reformers abandoned even the pretext of l1Sing 
Article Five. Through a series of election victories and the direct pressure of 
Roosevelt's court-packing scheme, the President and Congress persuaded 
the Supreme Court to produce decisions ratifying the reformers' vision of 
activist government.405 Significantly, the states played no role, and Roosevelt 
deliberately eschewed the Article Five process.406 Thus, as Ackerman 
concludes, the New ·Deal regime. "substituted a model of Presidential 
leadership of national institutions for a model of assembly leadership based 
399. Strauss, supta note 369, at 14 7~80. 
400. First Reconstruction Act ch .. 153, 14 Stat. 428, 429 (1867). 
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D. Roosevelt s "Courl-Packing" Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 34 7, 383-86 ( 1966). 
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on a dialogue between the nation and the states."407 One hears in the New 
Deal echoes of the Louisiana Purchase. Acting with broad popular support, 
the President and the Congress instituted constitutional change the 
expansion of federal power without resort to the Article Five method, even 
when a constitutional amendment could have been approved and ratified 
with relative ease. 
The use of a constitutional amendment to ratify the Louisiana Treaty 
would not necessarily have prevented the Civil War, or the Reconstruction 
transformation that increased the power of the federal government, but it 
would at least have reinf<?rced the importance of the states' role in 
implementing constitutional change. Moreover, as Professor Stephen Griffin 
summarized Jefferson's view, "[r]esort to amendment ensures that 
significant changes in constitutional practice are clearly recognized and 
openly debated.''408 If Jefferson and his Republican successors had regularly 
introduced amendments when seeking to expand the scope of federal 
power, starting with the Louisiana Purchase, then the Article Five 
. . 
amendment process would more likely have been seen later on as a way of 
addressing the most controversial issues, including slavery in th·e territories. 
A decision made through the amendment process would have had far more 
legitimacy and staying power than single-branch solutions such as Scott v. 
Sanford or the Missouri Compromise. Although the issue of slavery would 
never have been satisfactorily resolved until it was eliminated, even a 
decision by amendment to ratify the existence of slavery would have been 
preferable to war; at least in the short term, because slavery could be 
eliminated by the same peaceful means once the People were ready. 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE TREA1YPOWER TODAY AND THE NATIONALIST VIEW 
The Louisiana Purchase set a precedent for subsequent expansions of 
federal power, and a corresponding reduction of states' rights, through 
mere acts of the President and Congress. These expansions of federal power, 
through interpretation alone, did not give the states a voice in deciding the 
very constitutional changes that diminished each state's individual influence 
as well as the influence of one geographical section of the nation. The 
failure to seek a constitutional amendment left Jefferson's . popular 
revolution incomplete and provided the means for its unraveling. Empire of 
liberty federalism, while in its ascendancy, still faced the nagging questions 
posed by the balance of forces federalism. The ultimate triumph of the empire of 
liberty brand of states' rights destroyed the legitimacy of both, tied federalism 
to slavery, and paved the way for the rise of an even stronger national 
government. 
407. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 359, at 271; Herbert Wechsler; The Political Safeguards of 
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The world in which Thomas Jefferson and his Federalist opponents 
struggled with the constitutional implications of a peacefully expanding 
union seems distant from our own~ Today the prospects are obviously 
remote that the United States will acquire territory large enough to disrupt 
the balance among regional interests, nor is the nation likely to be bitterly 
divided along sectional lines by a single issue. But it is important to 
recognize that jefferson's con-cerns about the Louisiana Purchase arose, not 
from a bizarrely-strict and already~bsolete vision of national power, but 
from a desire to preserve the same core constitutional principles that are 
now the subject ,of a revival in the courts and intense debate in the academy. 
These concerns transcend Jefferson and his oft-idiosyncratic constitutional 
views, and would be just as valid were the U.S. now seeking to add new states 
to the Union. The Louisiana Purchase demonstrated that the opponents of 
the Constitution could not contemplate all of the ways in which the treaty 
power might be used to undermine states' rights. Warnings in 1790 by the 
Anti-Federalists that the federal government could, by treaty, sell portions of 
a states' territory or cede navigation rights crucial to a states' economy were 
• 
simply the contemporary manifestations of a fear that the states' 
independence, and their sovereignty, would be diminished or destroyed by 
an overreaching federal government. 
The harmful consequences of the Louisiana Purchase should cast doubt 
on the prevailing view of the treaty power today the '"nationalist" view·-
which holds that its scope is broad.409 The anchor for this view is the U.S. 
Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Holland, upholding the Migratory 
Bird Treaty with Canada, which lower courts held unconstitutional when it 
was enacted as ordinary legislation.410 Most scholars assume from the 
holding in Missouri that the President and the Senate, acting pursuant to the 
Treaty Clause, can regulate matters· of traditional state concern where 
Congress, acting under its Article I powers, cannot.411 The potential reach of 
the treaty power is not limitless, however. The Supreme Court has held, and 
scholars acknowledge, that the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and other explicit constitutional limits constrain the treaty power.412 And a 
treaty clearly must at least involve another foreign state; it cannot be a 
h 413 s am., 
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But within these hazy contours, disagreements over the intersection of 
the treaty power with states' rights have not abated. Most advocates of the 
nationalist view continue to maintain that, under Missouri v. Holland, 
federalism limitations simply do not apply to exercises of the treaty power. 414 
Professor David Golove recently argued for a modified nationalist view: 
while the anti-commandeering principles recognized in New York v. United 
States415 and Printz v. United States416 apply to the treaty power, Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity may not.417 Moreover, Golove adds, even 
the explicit Constitutional guarantees in the Bill of Rights and separation of 
powers principles do not apply as rigidly to the treaty power: they may 
"sometimes require a ... more forgiving construction when applied to 
treaties."418 How this "more forgiving" approach would play out is, of course, 
unclear until the Supreme Court considers a conflict between federalism 
principles and the treaty power. What is clear, according to Golove, is that 
the occasions where states' rights could interfere with the operation of a 
d . l 41 9 treaty are excee 1ng y rare. 
While its full potential remains untapped, the treaty power today still 
poses the threat to states' rights that the Anti-Federalists feared. 420 It is a 
reserve of virtually unlimited federal power that even believers in strict 
construction of the Constitution may find an irresistible means for carrying 
out their policies. This was no more apparent than during the Louisiana 
Purchase, when the Republicans, who had fought to presetve state 
prerogatives against an encroaching national government during the 
Federalist administrations, ratified and implemented the treaty despite its 
powerful impact on the rights of the existing states. 
As Professor John Yoo has pointed out, today's threats to state 
sovereignty through uses of the treaty power are subtler, but no less real or 
important.421 Ironically, it may fall to Jefferson's old enemy the courts to 
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resist efforts by th.e political branches to circumvent federalism principles by 
means of the treaty power.422 Globalization puts great pressure on the 
United States to conform to worldwide standards and delegate more 
authority to international organizations.423 The battle over competing visions 
of federalism waged during the Louisiana Purchase still holds a great deal of 
relevance for the contemporary debates about the treaty power.424 Recalling 
this two-hundred-year-old battle invites us to choose again between the 
empire of liberty and the balance of forces. How will these profound changes in 
the nature of the United States be given constitutional status in a process 
that recognizes the sovereignty of the states as well as the national 
government? 
In an era of globalization, the ability of the states to preserve their 
identities, and thus. preserve local accountability, will become more valuable 
than ever.425 Balance offorces federalism ought to be dusted off, because this 
vision of the Constitution preserves the interests of the existing states not 
states in the abstract where real people live and work. 
' 
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